Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-071
Thursday
11 April 1996

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FBIS-EEU-96-071 *11 April 1996*

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Albania: Ethnic Interests Harmed by Belgrade-Skopje Ties

AU1004110196 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 10 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by Blerim Reka: "Surprising Recognition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje and Belgrade have established full diplomatic relations. The news would not have been surprising if this had not been the first case of reciprocal recognition between Belgrade and a former Yugoslav republic. But this has involved Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], no less, whose name is internationally disputed by Greece, Serbia's traditional ally in the Balkans, and [came] despite opposition to this recognition from the Albanians within Macedonia. Greece and the Albanians emerge as the greatest losers from the diplomatic recognition of Skopje and Belgrade. Greece has realized that, in diplomacy, self-interest and pragmatism go before affection and loyalty, and that Serbia, in order to get rid of the European millstone that is around its neck and is preventing its recognition as a state, is forgetting the Serbian-Greek agreements on Old Serbia [term used for Macedonia and Kosova prior to World War II] that held good until recently. Meanwhile, after Macedonia's recognition of Serbia with occupied Kosova inside it, the Albanians have once again been confirmed in their position as a party whom few bother to ask on that side of the border. The Serbian-Macedonian interstate balance sheet is clear: recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name (in spite of Greek objections) as a reward for recognition of the continuity of the self-styled FRY, with Kosova within it (in spite of Albanian objections).

How can one otherwise explain the recent decision by Macedonia to recognize the judicial and state continuity of Serbia and Montenegro and to respect its territorial integrity? Did the Macedonian Government do this with or without the approval of the Albanian ministers and deputies? Was this a reward for the loyalty of about one-third of the population of Macedonia, who have to pay taxes and serve in the Macedonian Army, but who also ask about matters that deeply affect their national interests? Such a decision by Skopje might be reasonable if the Albanians in Macedonia had objected to the recognition of some Zulu state that did not involved any Albanians or Macedonians. However, to recognize, in the teeth of the objections of almost one-half of your citizens, Serbia's colonial regime in a disputed, conflict-ridden, and internationally open territory such as Kosova can only, at the very least, be called a snub to the Albanians by the Macedonian state.

If not for the sake of its own Albanian citizens, Macedonia should not have recognized Serbia and Montenegro, or at least should not have been the first, because of what the possible consequences of such a diplomatic recognition of Belgrade and the occupation regime in Kosova might be for the stability of its northwestern borders.

However, there is the no-less-important question of whether Tirana was officially aware of this diplomatic recognition exchanged between Belgrade and Skopje, or whether even this matter does not count for very much in Macedonia or for the international overseers of the Balkans.

Albania: Biography of New PD Chairman Tritan Shehu

AU0504201196 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tritan Shehu was born on 24 April 1949 in Tirana. He comes from an old intellectual family.

His father, originally from Gjirokaster, graduated in Lyons in France and worked as a teacher in Korce. He was an active participant in the Antifascist War. He was imprisoned and interned by the fascists. After the war, he was persecuted for his liberal ideas.

His mother comes of an old patriotic family. She completed her higher education in Rome. She was imprisoned and interned as an antifascist, while her father, a jurist, was executed by the Nazis.

Tritan Shehu completed higher studies in medicine in 1975 with excellent results. He organized and led the National Anesthesia-Reanimation Service, the first in Albania, turning it into a university and postuniversity school. He has earned the title of doctor professor. He has taken part in many national symposiums and has published articles, monographs, and textbooks. He is fluent in French, English, and Italian. He has been among the core activists of the Democratic Party [PD] since its creation. He was an activist close to the Tirana branch and was later elected a member of the PD National Council and Presidency. He was a deputy of Tirana and Lushnje in the 1991 to 1992 legislatures. Between April 1992 and December 1993, he was charged with the task of the health minister. As of December 1993, he has been performing the task of PD secretary general. He is married and has two children. As of today, he is the chairman of the Albanian PD.

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Albania: Commentary Sees Currency 'in Dire Straits'

AU1004103396 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 10 Apr 96 p 7

[Commentary by Perlat Klosi: "The Government Up, the Lek Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the government, Democratic Party [PD] officials, and even the head of state talk more and more about the magnificent success of their government, stressing the stability and even the convertibility of the lek. Their demagogy is as brazen as it is fraught with consequences. There is no question of convertibility with foreign currencies. You cannot make foreign payments with the lek, which makes nonsense of this demagogy and excitement.

At moments of seriousness, analysts have paused to consider the stability of the lek, pointing out that it does not rest on firm economic support. During this period of PD government, the stability of the lek has been based on secondary economic factors such as foreign currency from emigrants, foreign currency gained from smuggling to the former Yugoslavia, cattle rustling, the export of arms that several newspapers have mentioned, and economic aid from other countries. The influence of secondary factors in a small country is great, but these factors are also transient and can leave you stranded. Look at what is happening at the start of this year:

The substantial flow of contraband exports to the former Yugoslavia dried up after the lifting of the embargo, and this golden source of foreign currency for the Albanian financial market evaporated.

Economic aid in goods and foreign currency is not at the same level as in the first years of the emergency, especially now at the start of the year, when the actual deliveries have not taken place.

The volume of hard currency from emigrants has begun to decline for various reasons, such as migrants accumulate capital in the countries where they live, change their way of thinking and their life-styles, etc.

Under such circumstances, our lek is in dire straits. It is often exchanged at rates of one dollar to over 100 leks. The beginning of April was grim. Not even the PD National Assembly could revive the fortunes of the flagging lek. It is still not certain what kind of hemorrhage our lek will suffer, but the signs of an uncontrolled drain are evident. In order to make the government and the president feel comfortable, the Albanian banks are selling dollars on the currency market. The Albanian banks will have to pour away dollars several times before the end of the elections, to a limit defined by the state's foreign currency reserves. This path is uneconomic, damaging, and dangerous, fraught with very serious consequences. It is like the act of a dying man who stirs up trouble with his will.

The government is pleased with itself and imagines that it is rising higher, while the lek goes downhill.

Albania: Uncontrolled Minibanks Suspected of Fraud

AU1004163196 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 10 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by me. ki.: "No State Control Over Money With Interest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Interest fraud is becoming an everyday phenomenon. The most recent case was last Saturday [6 April], when three businessmen ended up in handcuffs, while keeping to themselves a mystery worth $2,500,000. The news is now public, but thousands of people are anxious. Are private firms that pay interest on money trustworthy or not? This problem, hitherto unknown in Albania, has reared its head in the last two years. First in Tirana, and subsequently in almost all districts of the country's cities, the first private minibanks have sprung up, paying enormous rates of monthly interest on money deposited with them. Within a short time, customers have abandoned the state banks and headed for them, even though they offer no serious guarantee.

However, what activities do these firms conduct to enable them to give their customers such favorable interest rates? Many citizens have fallen prey to the business of such firms. First came Hajdin Sejdia, the superman among fraudsters, who fleeced hundreds of citizens. He was followed, at least among those firms known to the organs of justice, by the Blini firm in Pogradec, the Xhaferri firm in Tirana—which dozens of citizens denounced for its nonpayment of interest—and last by the three businessmen arrested three days ago. Such activities, although legal and licensed by the state, have still not been put under state control. Do they involve suspicious activities? They were mentioned a few days ago at the first seminar on economic crime as a possible channel for the laundering of dirty money. The courts have still not dealt with such a case, but Alush Dragoshi, Albania's procurator-general, spoke about the need to create a group of investigators to study and fight against economic crime.

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Bulgaria: Lithuanian President on Ties, NATO

AU1104110296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 9 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas by Elena Trifonova; place and date not given: "For Russia, NATO Should Not Be an 'Aggressive Bloc'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Trifonova] Mr. President, what is your assessment of the development of relations between Bulgaria and Lithuania in the last six years, and what are the prospects for stimulating them further?

[Brazauskas] The establishment of diplomatic relations on 10 September 1991 opened a new page in the relations between our two states following their suspension half a century ago. It cannot be denied that, during these 50 years, we did have contacts and did learn something about each other. Despite this, we had no opportunity to communicate with one another as two sovereign states, freely and without "intermediaries" forced upon us. We must acknowledge that, in recent years, the cooperation between Bulgaria and Lithuania has not been particularly intensive. The real possibilities for this were not utilized. Lithuania is interested in developing cooperation, and I am convinced that Bulgaria feels the same way. The first priority is cooperation in the economic and trade fields. Of course, we should not forget culture, tourism, and other fields. As a goal for the near future, I may mention the creation of a treaty and legal basis for Lithuanian-Bulgarian relations. I will sign some important accords my visit. Other agreements under preparation will increase the opportunities for cooperation.

When speaking of cooperation, we should not forget our roots and the similarity between our fates. It is symbolic that the greatest and brightest figure in the period of renaissance of the Lithuanian national spirit at the end of the 19th century was Jonas Basanavicius, who built bridges between our nations. He lived in Bulgaria for 15 years and earned a name as a doctor and public figure in Varna and Lom. A street in Varna is named after him.

I believe that our bilateral relations have a good future.

[Trifonova] Will you comment on Lithuania's relations with Russia, and what problems are cropping up in the new situation?

[Brazauskas] Lithuania is interested in the further democratization of Russia, in Russia's integration into the world economic system, and in its active participation in resolving international problems. We want Moscow to objectively assess the desire for integration into the economic and security systems, including NATO. Lithuania is open for businesslike, good-neighborly, and constructive dialogue with Russia. [passage omitted]

[Trifonova] Your country wants to join NATO. What are the prospects?

[Brazauskas] We are pragmatic regarding Lithuania's prospects within the context of NATO's expansion. The study on the expansion of NATO that was announced on 25 September 1995 sees the countries that have signed association agreements with the EU as prospective NATO members. In this sense, Lithuania and the other Baltic republics are included in the list of potential candidates to join NATO. We are striving to join NATO and the EU, inasmuch as we are European states and, together with the western European countries, adhere to the principles and ideals of democracy, freedom of the individual, and observance of the laws. Lithuania is striving to join NATO chiefly to promote the strengthening of security and stability in Europe. I have always stressed that the expansion of NATO is inevitable, but at the same time it will depend of the mutual relations between Brussels and Moscow. Russia ought have given up the idea of NATO as an "aggressive bloc" long ago. The new spirit of the times and the deepening cooperation between all the countries of Europe should help to achieve this. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Pirinski Said Avoiding Brazauskas Delegation

LD1104110896 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas continues his visit to Bulgaria today.

Total integration into Western political, economic, and defense structures, regional cooperation, and relations with neighboring countries based on the principles of good neighborliness and international law—such are the main elements of Lithuania's foreign policy, as defined by President Algirdas Brazauskas in his speech to the Bulgarian parliament this morning. Brazauskas described membership in the European Union and NATO as a strategic goal and stressed that Lithuania does not see any alternatives to those organizations.

The president expressed Lithuania's readiness to consult Bulgaria and cooperate with this country in the attempts to gain European Union membership. Brazauskas said that Lithuania is interested in Bulgaria's experience in utilizing assistance from the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program.

At present, Lithuania defines NATO as the main and, objectively speaking, the only guarantee for security and stability in Europe, Algirdas Brazauskas said. The president stressed that it is important for all democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe to be granted

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equal opportunities to join NATO. Any decision on NATO enlargement, in Lithuania's opinion, has to include the Baltic countries in one way or another, the Lithuanian president said. He stressed that in Europe there should remain no gray zones with a vacuum of security.

He also said that it is important not to create an impression that Russia is being isolated. Russia must feel that NATO enlargement stretches the zone of security and stability further to the region neighboring with Russia, the Lithuanian leader said.

Algirdas Brazauskas noted that economic and trade cooperation between Lithuania and Bulgaria is not active. He said that it will become more active after expanding a basis of bilateral agreements and after signing a free trade agreement. Overcoming the distance that separates us from highly developed Western European countries could be easier if we cooperate closely and fruitfully between ourselves, the Lithuanian president said.

Bulgarian Foreign Affairs Minister Georgi Pirinski refused to take part in negotiations with the Lithuanian delegation, protesting against Lithuania's firm determination to integrate into NATO, as expressed by Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, the Baltic News Service reported.

According to the largest Bulgarian independent daily newspaper, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pirinski appeared on Wednesday just to sign documents with Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys. The newspaper believes that the minister is avoiding meetings with the Lithuanian delegation because the Bulgarian Government, which is in opposition to the country's president and is dominated by former communists, would like to see closer ties to Russia, and not to NATO.

Today, after a second meeting between Algirdas Brazauskas and Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, the leaders of both countries held a news conference. The Lithuanian delegation, headed by Algirdas Brazauskas, which includes Minister of Foreign Affairs Povilas Gylys, members of the Seimas [parliament] Juras Pozela and Jonas Antanaitis, presidential adviser for foreign affairs Justas Paleckis, presidential spokeswoman Lidija Sabajevaite, and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will visit the resort town of Varna. In Varna, the Lithuanian president will spend approximately four hours. He will meet Khristo Kirchev, the mayor of the town. A tour of the town will be arranged for Brazauskas. It will include, inter alia, a visit of the street named after Dr. Jonas Basanavicius [a Lithuanian liberal ideologist, who inspired Lithuania's national revival and lived in Varna between 1892 and 1895].

At approximately 1700, Algirdas Brazauskas and the delegation will leave for Tbilisi. The official visit of the Lithuanian president in Georgia will start tomorrow. Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze told the national radio of Georgia today that the visit of the Lithuanian president will help to restore relations between Georgia and Lithuania which, according to Shevardnadze, have been frozen in the past years.

Bulgaria: Gaytandzhiev Views Coming NATO Meeting

AU0904150896 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 8 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Gaytandzhiev, leader of the permanent Bulgarian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, by Milena Borisova; place and date not given: "The Issue of Whether or Not To Join NATO Is Not Imperative to Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Borisova] Mr. Gaytandzhiev, what do you expect from the session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly political committee in Moscow?

[Gaytandzhiev] This session is on the subject of European security in the new century and the Russian position. It is no accident that it is taking place in Moscow. I received a personal invitation, and during the session I will have an opportunity to hold talks at the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries, while meetings are also scheduled in the Russian State Duma.

[Borisova] Will you ask Grachev to explain his claim that Russia is ready to set up bases in Bulgaria if NATO has bases in Poland?

[Gaytandzhiev] I will participate in the debates and will naturally be interested to hear the Russian position. I will have a good opportunity to expound our own position on the issue of European security and on Bulgaria's place and role as part of the old continent. The issue of NATO's possible expansion to the east will inevitably arise, and I will stress that our country is in a phase of active dialogue, but in no event is the issue of whether or not to join NATO an imperative.

[Borisova] Does this mean that you will avoid the controversial issues that were the main topic last week, for example, the USSR-2 question?

[Gaytandzhiev] I told you that I will have an opportunity to explain our position. However, I cannot comment on statements that have been circulated in the media. These cannot be accepted at their true value.

A press report is one thing, but an official statement or declaration is something else. I want you to understand

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me correctly; I am not going to Moscow to make declarations, but to take part fully in the debate.

Bulgaria: Russia Says Yeltsin's Words 'Taken Out of Context'

AU1004132196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 10 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Goran Gotev from Moscow: "Negative Campaign Regarding Yeltsin's Words Has Been Organized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mikhail Demurin, first deputy director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department, answered DUMA's questions regarding the note that Bulgarian Ambassador Khristo Miladinov lodged at the Russian Foreign Ministry yesterday.

According to Demurin, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov stated that as far as he knew, the reporting on the signing of the relevant documents and President Yeltsin's interview in this connection was not fully covered in Bulgaria, and the phrase in question was taken out of context. In this connection, the Russian side finds the sharp reaction of certain Bulgarian leaders inexplicable.

Russia has repeatedly stated at the highest level that no one has any intention of forcing anyone to join any integration unions. Bulgaria—and this is a fact—is a country that is one of Russia's closest friends; I am thinking of countries that are close from a historical and cultural viewpoint, Demurin declared. Anyway, he added, even now the development of political and economic relations between our two countries allows us to speak of close friendly and mutually beneficial links.

We believe that, under the influence of short-term speculative interests, which are manifesting themselves especially vividly in connection with purely domestic events in Bulgaria, someone is mounting a negative campaign around these statements by our president. It is important to prevent any backsliding in our mutual relations, and it is important for them to develop in all fields to the benefit of our peoples and states, the Russian diplomat emphasized.

We accepted the contents of the note for our information, Demurin said, and we will base our position on the standpoint that all the necessary explanations have already been made during the conversation between our deputy minister and the Bulgarian ambassador.

We do not expect any deterioration in our bilateral relations. What is more, we will do everything to ensure that this speculative short-term campaign, provoked by the above-mentioned interpretation of the president's attitude to Bulgaria, does not negatively affect our relations, Demurin said in conclusion.

Bulgaria: Commentator Wants Russian Ambassador's Recall

AU1004124396 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 6 Apr 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Ibrishimov: "Avdeyev, Go Home, and at Once!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By behaving like a governor general, Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev confirmed two things that normal Bulgarians have known well for a long time, namely that Moscow continues to regard our country as a trans-Danube province and that President Yeltsin made no slip of the tongue when he mentioned Bulgaria as a potential member of USSR-2.

The Russians' blindness should come as no surprise to people who follow the evolution of our bilateral relations. From the Kremlin's viewpoint, the barren behavior of the Bulgarian Communists is evidently a sufficiently strong argument for allowing themselves to make unprecedentedly brazen diplomatic moves. Minister Pirinski has found himself in the role of a supplicant vassal, thanks to the government's belated, inadequate, and servile reaction to Yeltsin's statement. The main reason for the disgrace is the silence of Prime Minister Videnov, who, from the moral viewpoint at least, is no longer entitled to call himself Bulgaria's prime minister. True to his communist renunciation of his native land, he preferred to remain silent, not to react, and in the final analysis to shirk responsibility for the mess that he, Sendov, and Pirinski created between them.

The behavior of the parliament Communists [deputies of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP] also helped, as they stopped the National Assembly from issuing a strong statement of its position regarding the infringement of our national sovereignty. The BSP's creatures—the Fatherland Party of Labor, Nationwide Committee for Defense of National Interests, and others—also helped, by jumping as if they were stung whenever something is heard about NATO, but remaining silent whenever Russia's name is mentioned.

In Bulgaria, a real fifth column exists that supports Russian imperialism. We cannot expect the Kremlin spy residency in Pozitano Street [BSP headquarters] to defend the interests of our native land. However, Avdeyev should be made to understand very clearly that he is no longer welcome in Bulgaria. The sooner he shakes the dust of Sofia off his feet, the better will be the chances for normal relations between Bulgaria and Russia.

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Bulgaria: DPS Deputies Complain to CE Visitors

AU1104134296 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Domenique Columberg and Jean Setlenger, observers from the Council of Europe [CE] Parliamentary Assembly, met in the National Assembly with Yunal Lyutfi, Ibrahim Tatarlu, and other deputies of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]. The main subject of the talks was how Bulgaria is fulfilling the commitments it has assumed regarding democratic development.

The DPS deputies made a number of critical remarks: Bulgaria has failed to sign the framework convention on the rights of national minorities. The Bulgarian Constitution contains a ban on ethnically and religiously based parties. The government of the Left displays a tendency to restrict human rights, especially ethnic ones, and uses legislation for this purpose, such as the laws on the Bulgarian language and on radio and television. The state is interfering in the affairs of the Chief Mufti's Office. These were the points that the DPS deputies made, according to a statement that Ibrahim Tatarlu made to our parliamentary correspondent Vladislav Ustoich.

Bulgaria: Trade Minister Leaves for Visit to Germany

AU1004180396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Late this afternoon Atanas Paparizov, minister of trade and foreign economic cooperation, left on a short official visit to Germany. He summarized the subjects to be discussed during his visit in a statement to our correspondent Sonya Subcheva:

[Begin Paparizov recording] I will have the opportunity to have discussions with German Economics Minister Rexrodt. Germany is one of our most important EU partners, and I expect to be able to review with him all the joint initiatives at various levels that will help develop trade and economic links. There is a program called Transform that the German Government is helping with. The German Government is ready to offer us assistance in forming a bank for small and medium-sized enterprises. There are a number of other projects, which even include a project to help private bakers set up their associations. I will soon have an opportunity to discuss this project in Plovdiv with representatives of German organizations for assisting trade. The range of subjects is very wide and naturally includes investment and the use by the Bulgarian side of funds to guarantee investment in Bulgaria under the Hermes scheme. I will also be holding very important meetings with the trade ministers of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. There are a large number of bilateral issues that we have to examine. [end recording]

Bulgaria: Cabinet Raises Electricity Prices by 40 Percent

AU1104093996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 11 Apr 96

[Report by Kalina Stancheva from the Council of Ministers building in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At its meeting today, the Cabinet adopted a decree approving the version for energy price rises that was agreed upon yesterday in the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation. As of 1 May, electricity prices for domestic consumers will rise by 37.2 percent, and for industry and business by 55.4 percent. These increases include 18 percent value-added tax. Accordingly, the new average selling price of electricity will be 40.9 percent higher. The price of thermal energy for domestic consumers will rise from the present price of 810 leva per gigacalorie to 1,141 leva. The prices of briquettes will rise by 16.1 percent, and coal by 13 percent. [passage omitted]

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Czech Republic: Daily Analyzes Foreign Ministry Report

AU1004161796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 10 Apr 96 p 12

[Commentary by Michal Mocek and Lubos Palata: "Czech Diplomacy in a Pink Negligee"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The summary of the Foreign Ministry's activities in the years 1993-96, submitted to the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee last week, reveals much about the real state of Czech diplomacy. It certainly is not bad, but it also definitely does not merit great celebratory fanfare.

Integration into the European and Atlantic structures is understandably ranked in first place among the objectives of Czech foreign policy. The report itself, however, points out that the Republic has not taken any independent initiative steps that would bring the prospect of membership in the European Union or NATO closer. This is reflected in the conclusion, since no reference is made—in the summary of the results of our four-year foreign policy effort—to progress in our endeavor for membership in these organizations.

According to the Foreign Ministry's own assessment, with regard to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Czech diplomacy strived "to improve the quality of the organization's activity." The report, of course, keeps quiet about the departure from Prague of the OSCE's supreme bodies, the location of the organization's headquarters in Vienna, and the lessening of our activity within the OSCE in general.

Breaking away from Slovakia has altered the significance of bilateral relations. Slovakia itself now serves Prague, first and foremost, as a springboard. Czech diplomacy, according to the document, "makes full use of and presents successfully the advantages of the new state compared with the former federation and the other successor state." The problem is, however, whether this policy does not create unnecessary points of friction between Czechs and Slovaks. Prague has also not included Slovakia among its partners for traditional cross-border cooperation, partners such as Poland, Germany, and Austria. The report at least does not hide the fact that there has been a decline in mutual relations. They are merely stable and correct.

Relations with Russia and the states of eastern and southeastern Europe also merited the attribute "correct." So, this description also concerns the Baltic states and Romania, or, to put it differently, our partners in the quest for membership in the European Union and NATO. According to the report, cooperation with Russia in recent years has been limited to supplies of raw materials and support for trade, which, unfortunately, corresponds to the minimization of contacts with Moscow.

Germany is, in the looking glass of the report, the only state regarding which the Republic has national interests. "The endeavor for multilateral positive relations with Germany was associated fundamentally with a thorough respect for national interests," it states. Intensive contacts were apparently maintained in all spheres of bilateral cooperation. Of course, this hardly applies in the case of the intensity of the meetings between Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl or the intensity of interest in the cross-border Euroregions. Their existence is, on the contrary, more likely to cause disputes.

The primacy of the economy in foreign policy is underlined by the opening of new representative offices in "economically interesting territories" and the establishment of a network of Czech centers. The report talks about cooperation with the Trade and Industry Ministry, which is somewhat paradoxical because there have been a number of misunderstandings between these departments in this very sphere—first and foremost, in the issue of setting up and running the centers.

An extensive and very laudatory passage devoted to the foreign political activities of President Havel is also contained in the document. This is in contrast to the absolute silence about the importance of Prime Minister Klaus's foreign visits. This is certainly not a coincidence and bears witness to the fact that the ministry's cooperation with the Castle was considerably better that its cooperation with the Cabinet.

In general, it is possible to state that Czech diplomacy sees itself in rosy colors and does not admit its shortcomings. One can only hope that this is just a preelection tactic.

Czech Republic: Poll Surveys Public's Fear of Germany

AU1104084296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Apr 96 p 10

[Article by Prague correspondent Alena Borovickova: "Czechs Are Afraid of Germany"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Factum agency recently presented the latest public opinion poll focusing on Czech-German relations. It clearly confirmed that, for a number of reasons, the Czechs are afraid of their western neighbor.

As the figures show, 50 percent of the population sees in Germany an economic threat, and a full 39

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percent perceives Germany as a political danger. One-quarter of respondents fear Germany's military strength. In comparison with 1992, Czechs' fear of Germans has risen approximately 5 percent. Jan Herzmann, director of the Factum agency, explains this fact with the post-November [1989] euphoria that prevailed in international relations then. Meanwhile, it has been supplanted by the realization that conflicting areas exist also in the economy and in policy. The fact that Czech-German relations have not yet been settled and the joint declaration has not been signed has even multiplied those doubts. The Factum agency has also presented a chart, according to which voters of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Left Bloc, the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Social Democratic Party, and also, for example, the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] fear Germany the most. One of the SD-LSNS cochairmen is Jiri Dienstbier, former minister of foreign affairs, who was preparing the treaty with Germany.

The Factum poll also centered on the Czech-German declaration. Approximately 7 percent of the population are of the opinion that it should include a passage on apology to the Sudeten Germans for the postwar wild transfer [divy odsun].

On the other hand, as many as 86 percent believe that the Germans do not deserve an apology. According to unofficial sources from both the Czech and German sides, which claim that the declaration is ready, it does include a passage on apology to the Sudeten Germans, however.

Czech Republic: Plans for T-72 Tank Modernization Criticized

AU1104102296 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 9-14 Apr 96 No 15, p 3

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "A Futile Struggle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Ministry is persevering in projects with which it has already failed utterly in both parliament and the government. The issue again involves the "Soviet" T-72 tank. Last December, the Chamber of Deputies recommended that the modernization of this obsolete monster be halted, but Minister Holan's office is of a different opinion. The firms that won last year's tender are continuing to work on two prototypes of the modernized tank. This order alone will cost the state 60 million korunas [Kc]. We will pay, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has still not put the finishing touches to the concept for the Army's development, so no one actually knows how many and what kind of tanks our Army will need in the future.

A Prototype Maybe Next Year

The post-November [1989] history of the domestic "72's" is full of ups and downs. Under Marian Calfa's federal government, we exported them from the Slovak production halls straight to Syria. International disgrace, however, threw cold water on this good deal and a problem arose: What are we to do with the outmoded tanks in which only dictators and terrorists are interested? The answer from the domestic arms manufacturers was: Modernize. Defense officials began to consider this option as early as 1992. In the next two years, a prototype was built and tested successfully in cooperation with the French Sagem company. But a month later the Chamber of Deputies approved the law on state tenders, and the ministry had to announce a tender for the tank's modernization. To the great surprise of the experts, it was won not by Sagem but by the Italian Galileo company.

But Holan's office ori[illegible]ly had other plans. Three months before the announcement of the tender, the minister published the so-called acquisition plan, a kind of binding schedule for the arms plants and also for the government that suggested how much and in what the Army wanted to invest in the next 10 years. The Kc2.5 billion earmarked for tanks in the document represents, of course, a mere fifth of the sum reckoned with in the tender announcement for the modernization of the 350 T-72's. Officials then said that it was in fact enough to modernize only 200 tanks. It is no surprise that the somersaults in the plans and requirements for the investments aroused displeasure in the government and among the deputies.

Holan will probably not draw up the concept for the Army—rejected twice already—before the elections. So today no one in this country can say how many and what kind of tanks we will in fact need. For your information, Belgium, for example, is currently discarding and selling 150 of its 330 tanks, and Norway has 170 tanks. As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, the politicians and experts cannot agree whether it is better for us to have several dozen of the most modern types of tanks or, on the other hand, to keep in their garages as many of the "iron fortresses" as the international treaty on conventional armed forces permits—that is, almost 1,000 armored giants, including the really obsolete T-55 tanks.

Purchase Leopards

The idea of modernizing the 25-year-old "72" is, given the current rapid developments in arms technology, contentious. The Defense Ministry, however, had argued that the Czech arms industry would thus be given

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an opportunity. Although the tender was eventually won by foreign companies, Czech industry would after all participate in the serial production (for example, the tanks would be assembled in Novy Jicin, and the gearboxes should be manufactured in the Prague Praga enterprise). The Czech arms manufacturers had expected that their participation in the production of the modernized type would open up foreign markets—there are still approximately 7,000 T-72's throughout the world and some of them in countries that are not risk countries. But, in the end, we also lost this battle. The victorious firms were supposed to have built two modernized prototypes (one free of charge and the other for roughly 60 million [currency not specified]) before the end of February. They did not meet the deadline, and it is expected that they will not be ready until May of next year. The modernized tanks will then go through at least six months of trials, and only afterwards will the Army decide if the new type of tank suits it. According to the program for the tender, serial production should begin next March, but no one is venturing to forecast the real date. In the meantime, of course, the Poles and Pakistanis have modernized their T-72's, the Finns and Ukrainians are putting the finishing touches to a new prototype, and these countries have probably divided the market among themselves (for example, India, Romania, and Hungary). The Czechs will come later.

There is another solution. Why not dust off, in this sphere, the idea of converting the arms industry, purchase—for half the sum earmarked for the modernization of the T-72—60 supermodern Challengers, Le Clercs, or Leopards, and thus rid ourselves once and for all of the tank problem? Italy is obviously acting in a similar fashion. Rome had originally planned to construct a "national tank," the Ariette (and it entrusted this to the same firm to whom the Czechs later entrusted the modernization of "their" 72's—the Galileo), but, according to the most recent unofficial reports, the Italians eventually decided to build only 150 of these tanks and, to complete the state's defense, to purchase, in addition, German Leopards.

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Slovakia: Sitek Adviser: Neutrality 'Attractive' Alternative

AU1004155596 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 6 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by "VLMO": "Government for NATO, Citizens for Neutrality?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Institute for Public Opinion Research [IVVM] operating under the Slovak Statistical Office recently published the results of a representative poll conducted among citizens of the Slovak Republic regarding the military and political orientation of the Slovak Republic. In the poll, 47 percent of respondents advocated the military-political neutrality of the Slovak Republic, while 34 percent were in favor of the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO and 5 percent supported an alliance with Russia. Fourteen percent of those polled did not deliver an opinion. At the same time, the Policy Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic declares the Slovak Republic's endeavor to join NATO. In this interesting situation, a news conference was held on the topic "Aims and Main Directions of the Defense Department's International Military Cooperation."

Engineer Pavol Hrivik, adviser of the minister of defense of the Slovak Republic, noted that it would be interesting to know the degree of citizens' knowledge about what neutrality is. He also pointed out that the above IVVM survey was the first of its kind and that more serious conclusions about citizens' views on the military and political orientation of the Slovak Republic could be drawn only after approximately the third such survey. However, even this survey indicates, in his opinion, that a significant part of the citizens of Slovakia see for the Slovak Republic a different alternative than NATO entry. This goal is laid down in the Policy Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic, but Slovakia must have also other variants worked out.

"That is why we do not rule out the variant of neutrality, or other variants," Engineer Pavol Hrivik said and described the alternative of neutrality as attractive for the Slovak Republic. At the same time he warned that proclaiming neutrality is not a problem, the problem is its feasibility. Belgium also proclaimed its neutrality, which did not prevent its being attacked in 1938. Its neutrality was guaranteed neither by treaties, nor by the great powers. Slovak Defense Minister's adviser Engineer Pavol Hrivik also observed that, compared with the situation in 1991, the conditions for the neutrality project are now more complicated. "Had Gorbachev, during the pullout of [Soviet] troops from Germany, raised the issue of neutrality of the countries of Central Europe, it would have surely been accepted," he said. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Commentary Criticizes Meciar's Policy Toward EU

AU1004141296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Apr 96 p 4

[Commentary by Jan Skoda: "Compromise With Brussels Is Impossible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It will be interesting to find out what our government representatives will be putting in the questionnaire for candidates for EU membership that Bratislava should be receiving from Brussels one of these days. Particularly the questions that ask about the steps that the Slovak Government has taken to have legislative norms approximate to those of our western European partners.

According to official as well as unofficial reactions by government representatives, it is to be assumed that the Penal Code amendment will not appear in the answers in the form in which it was approved by the legislature of the Slovak Republic a couple of days ago. Members of Meciar's government are again resorting to arguments that turn everything upside down. Whereas last autumn there was an misplaced and pointless discussion over whether the EU had sent us a demarche or a communique, today we are justifiedly indignant because Brussels saw fit to allow itself to be heard before the amended law came into force.

It seems that we are poor at reading the warnings from an organization whose favor we seek. In the October demarche and in the declaration of Wednesday [3 April], the EU had to remind us of the conclusions of the Copenhagen summit, which our experts must have carefully analyzed and must know down to the last detail. Why, then, do we not abide by them? The only difference between the demarche and the declaration is that last year we received a demarche and today "only" a declaration.

We can also ponder over the explanation that Meciar is in a difficult position (which, incidentally, he has himself caused because he chose his coalition partners) and had to accept compromises in relations with the Slovak National Party [SNS], without which the Slovak-Hungarian treaty would not have been passed by the Slovak Parliament. This is true only if we agree with the assumption that he had no other choice but to come to an agreement with the parliamentary deputies. However, what matters now is that playing such secret games, let alone making compromises such as those with the SNS, is not possible with the EU. When it comes to joining

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the EU, the conditions are set down definitively and we will either accept them or will stay outside the Union.

Minister Schenk's words that, in the event of misunderstandings it is necessary to discuss matters, are therefore misplaced. In this case, it is only the Slovak side that misunderstood the common cause. To Brussels it is clear what democracy and human rights are and which law favors democracy and which violates it.

Our inability to learn from our own mistakes is surprising. How much effort the supporters of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty invested for it to be ratified in Slovak Parliament before the start of the EU Intergovernmental Conference in Turin! In the end, we met the deadline, but at a price that will probably outweigh the value of the bilateral interstate document. We still do not realize that it is not enough to take just one step ahead. Our partners want us to keep walking.... Toward principles that they profess and with which it is not possible to strike any compromises.

Slovakia: Meciar, Austrian Chancellor View Bilateral Talks

LD1004164096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Austrian Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky arrived for a brief unofficial visit to the Slovak Republic this morning. [passage omitted]

The Austrian chancellor had a working breakfast with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar this morning. Our editor Igor Skocek attended a short press briefing at the Government Office. [passage omitted]

[Skocek] After today's working breakfast lasting more than 90 minutes, the Austrian chancellor told Radiozurnal the following about the talks:

[Begin Vranitzky recording, in German with superimposed Slovak translation] We focused first and foremost on the preparation for two events. We discussed my visit, which is being prepared, and bilateral talks to be held during this year. During these talks we would like to discuss a whole number of interesting projects.

The most important thing that should be pointed out in this respect is that Austria has concluded bilateral agreements on regional projects and regional cooperation with most of its neighbors, and by doing this, it made use of the European Union's regional funds.

We would like to conclude an agreement of this kind also with Slovakia. It should be a linchpin of our bilateral cooperation.

The second point is that we have begun building a trilateral cooperation between Hungarian, Austrian, and Slovak prime ministers. As it is the Slovak Republic, which is acting as a host country this year, a meeting between Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Vladimir Meciar will probably take place in June, and I shall also come to Slovakia. [end recording]

The Austrian federal chancellor is accompanied during his brief visit by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, who commented on the purpose of this visit.

[Begin Schenk recording] We are pleased we had an opportunity to informally discuss the matters Vranitzky spoke about. We regard our bilateral and trilateral cooperation, the border cooperation, the issue of border procedures adjustments, and other issues that were discussed as matters of exceptional importance. We are pleased to see that another important step has been made.

We were also interested to hear what Chancellor Vranitzky had to say about the course and immediate tasks of the intergovernmental conference in connection with the participation of associated countries [to the European Union]. What we regard as very important—and this was stresssed by the chancellor—is that Slovakia is being considered as a member of the first group of countries to join the European Union. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Kovac Not To Raise Human Rights Issues in PRC

AU1004142496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "ik, kh": "Michal Kovac Departed for China"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—Slovak President Michal Kovac and his wife left for an official visit to the PRC early yesterday evening. The head of state is being accompanied by a group of National Council of the Slovak Republic deputies and representatives of business circles.

At a news conference prior to his departure, the president said that China was a world power, whose significance and influence in the world were constantly growing. [passage omitted]

Asked whether he intended to raise the issues of nuclear testing and human rights observance, for which the world condemns China, Kovac said that, if the Chinese side itself did not raise these issues, the Slovak side would not be commenting on them, because they were not on the agenda of the planned talks. Asked how he could explain that Slovak Television, a public corporation, was not represented in the entourage of

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accredited journalists, the president said: "It has been evident for a long time that Slovak Television is not a public corporation, but rather the government coalition's television, and the government coalition apparently takes exception to the president. This is how I explain the absence of Slovak Television, even though it is a serious shortcoming and definitely does no credit to the good name of the Slovak Republic." [passage omitted]

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 10 April on page 2 carries a 150-word TASR report on a letter addressed by the Slovak branch of Amnesty International to President Kovac, asking the president "to appeal for the observance of human rights during his visit to the PRC" and "subsequently to inform the citizens of the Slovak Republic about his steps in this sphere."]

Slovakia: Arms Factory Workers Reportedly in Libya Since Feb

AU0904151296 Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak 6 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "iy": "Did They Go to Libya Just for Recreation? Former ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom Employees in Country That Is Subject to Sanctions and an Arms Embargo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava/Martin/Dubnica—Ten former employees of the Slovak ZTS [Heavy Engineering Works] Dubnica nad Vahom arms manufacturing company are currently staying in Libya, a country that is subject to economic sanctions, including an arms embargo, imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions No. 748/1992 and No. 833/1993. According to our information, some of the employees worked for many years in managerial positions in the ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom "Special Production" department (arms production).

As we were told at the Personnel Department of the aforementioned company, the 10 employees had terminated their contracts of employment with ZTS prior to their departure for Libya.

NOVY CAS obtained information about the departure of 10 employees for Libya on 1 February 1996 through a private company from Martin. In a telephone interview, one of the managers of the Martin firm assured the NOVY CAS reporter that the employees are not engaged in any work in Libya that would have anything in common with the arms industry. However, he refused to specify the mission with which they left for Libya. "We are a private firm and this is none of your business. You can write that they went there for recreation," said the employee of the Martin firm.

We turned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic with the question whether the very fact that 10 former employees of a company that used to produce arms went to work in Libya is not in breach of the UN sanctions.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic is not aware of any facts that would indicate noncompliance on the part of the Slovak Republic with the UN Security Council resolution on economic sanctions, including the arms embargo," Juraj Matejovsky, the ministry's spokesman, said in a statement.

Slovakia: Hungarian Coalition Warns Budapest About Treaty

LD1104112296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia's Hungarian Coalition [an umbrella organization of Hungarian parties represented in the Slovak parliament] expects that the Hungarian Government will implement the Basic Treaty [between Hungary and Slovakia] in the form signed by the two prime ministers because the Slovak interpretation of the treaty could become a source of tension in relations between our countries. This point was emphasized by Miklos Duray [chairman of the Hungarian movement Coexistence], Bela Bugar [chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement], and Laszlo Nagy [chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party] during a meeting with representatives of the Hungarian Government yesterday. More details in a telephone report from Budapest by correspondent Gregor Martin Papucsek:

[Papucsek] The Hungarian Coalition's top representatives met Csaba Tabajdi, state secretary at the Hungarian prime minister's office, who is responsible for minorities' affairs. They said they were interested in meeting also the Hungarian foreign minister and prime minister.

They feel that these consultations are a normal and natural matter and reject accusations that the only reason for their going to Budapest is to complain. Moreover, the Hungarian Government is keen to get to know what they think about developments in Slovak-Hungarian relations.

Csaba Tabajdi stressed this fact and reaffirmed the well-known position that Budapest regards the National Council's [Slovak parliament] resolution on the interpretation of the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty as a unilateral act with no international political consequences. The Hungarian side is planning to introduce measures to control implementation of the Basic Treaty, including speedy establishment of a mixed commission, a provision already included in the treaty.

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Miklos Duray, Bela Bugar and Laszlo Nagy said at a news conference in the evening that they have doubts about the Slovak Government's sincere intention to implement the treaty and said they have already informed—or rather, that they will inform—their counterparts abroad, as well as international institutions, about the situation they are in.

The Hungarian Coalition rejects the National Council's resolution on their interpretation of the Basic Treaty, although it agrees with the treaty. The Coalition regards as important the provision empowering both sides to comment on minority issues in the other country, which means that the situation of minorities is not an internal affair of just one country.

This is Gregor Martin Papucsek for Slovak Radio, Budapest.

Slovakia: Court Ruling on Kovac Appointments Power Sought

LD1004204096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Government has asked the Constitutional Court to give an expert opinion on the president's powers to appoint an ambassador to the United Nations Organization. Our colleague Renata Havranova has sent us the following report from Bratislava:

[Havranova] The recent decision by Slovak President Michal Kovac not to appoint Olga Keltosova, the current minister of labor and social affairs, to the post of extraordinary ambassador and head of a permanent mission of the Slovak Republic in the United Nations has aroused a strong aversion in government circles. During his meeting with Keltosova, the president conditioned her appointment on her distancing herself from a government statement from last autumn in which the cabinet accused the head of state of efforts to disrupt the constitutional and democratic system and called Kovac a traitor. Keltosova allegedly strongly rejected the demand. Shortly after that, Prime Minister Meciar announced that Slovakia would not submit another candidate since it did not want to embarrass itself again in front of the world because of the president.

The whole case will have a continuation in the Constitutional Court since the government has approved a proposal to submit a request to give an explanation of the article of the Constitution on the basis of which the president receives and appoints ambassadors. The government believes that the president has chosen a way that violates the Constitution when he conditioned his endorsement of Keltosova's appointment on meeting certain conditions. According to the opposition press, Kovac does not deny the content of his meeting with Minister Keltosova, but claims that the official standpoint on her appointment sent to Vladimir Meciar does not contain any conditions.

In a statement from the president's office that was granted to Czech Radio by the press department, Michal Kovac also rejects the prime minister's accusations that he has been using such methods to fight the HZDS [Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] since March of 1993. He also points out that it is the ruling Movement [HZDS] that does not accept communication. An example of this is a rude rejection of the president's invitation to the Movement's members to become part of the delegation for the official visit to China, which Michal Kovac began today.

Slovakia: Cardinal Comments on Penal Code Amendment

AU1004125996 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 9 Apr 96 p 5

[Statement by Jan Chryzostom Cardinal Korec: "How To Protect the Good Name of Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia, like any other country, has many problems. The Slovak ones include, however, two major concerns. The first one is the concern about the good name of the young state of the Slovak Republic and its protection, and the second, equally important, concern has to do with the freedom of citizens. These two concerns are interrelated. Many responsible officials and citizens believe that false information and reports have been sent directly from Slovakia abroad and in many respects harmed the Slovak Republic, and by extension, through the economic consequences, also its citizens. Slovakia has been described as a country without freedom of expression and compared to countries where journalists are jailed. Very few people protested against this. A draft amendment to the Penal Code emerged, which should protect the Slovak Republic against false information—especially that going abroad—and against some acts. Since this amendment would curb, in its present wording, some freedoms of the citizens, it gave rise to great concerns and opposition of another section of society and the church leaders.

Many reflective people ask: How can the good name of Slovakia be protected? By restricting freedoms? This is precisely our second concern—and it is even greater than the first. After all, the first concern is gradually resolved by life itself, for the truth about the name comes out—visitors come, foreign delegations and they can see how many critical articles appear in the press, and what is broadcast on television and radio. They adjust their views accordingly. Thus life itself often

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protects the good name of the Slovak Republic. Limited freedoms, however, made servants, even prisoners of us under the former regime. It used to suffice to accuse someone who told the truth, of having done so out of hostility towards a socialist country. That was very bad.

It is immoral to harm the nation, the state, and Slovakia. To restrict the citizens' freedom of expression, however, may be even more immoral. Every country is well-justified in protecting its rights. That is done all across Europe. A civilized country does it rigorously but in a civilized manner, and especially in a legally correct manner. After all, every country protects the freedom of expression of its citizens. This notion should be of common interest in the matter of the amendment to the Penal Code. All comments should be stated clearly and in this spirit, and the National Council of the Slovak Republic should consider these comments seriously and with full responsibility before history. Freedom means neither heedlessness with respect to information nor servility in terms of expression of opinions. No one can cause harm with impunity; and no one can be harmed with impunity either. Freedom means justice.

Bills are tabled, analyzed, and improved, and subsequently voted on. Even a problematic law can be adopted by vote, however, even one that is viewed by many as dangerous. If that is the case, it is necessary to analyze it again, and submit reasons for clear stances. It is good if this is done without involving emotions. This possibility was proclaimed publicly in and out of parliament—the wording of laws can be improved by comments to produce good laws. There are several constitutional democratic institutions in Slovakia which facilitate and guarantee this. In the case of a flawed law or some of its sections, similarly to any other democracy, there is a constitutional possibility for the president, upon consideration, to return the bill to the parliament, and he legally justifies this step. Equally important is the fact that there is another democratic possibility in Slovakia—to lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which in turn will in a businesslike and responsible manner decided whether or not the law violates an article of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Slovak citizens can count on these pillars of the constitution. They also can freely and matter-of-factly publish their views to help the good cause—in a civilized and democratic manner, and here also in the spirit of Christianity for the public good. That is all in accordance with the spirit of the Gospel and the universal mission of the church.

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Hungary: Tender Rigging for U.S. Company Alleged

LD0904200896 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The parliament's Defense Committee has not managed to make much progress, for the time being, in the enquiry about corruption allegations in connection with the tender invited for an air defense system. According to opposition deputies, tenders were invited in such a way that only a certain company could be the winner of the investment worth several billions.

[Unidentified correspondent] On the basis of a report submitted by Tamas Wachsler, opposition deputy, the Defense Committee argued for five hours about whether there was substantial suspicion of corruption regarding the circumstances of the invitation for tender; however, Wachsler was not allowed to give a statement.

According to information obtained by this station, the allegation discussed at the closed meeting was that bids were invited in such a way that the specifications could only be met by Westinghouse, an American company. The radar in question costs about 10 billion forints. [passage omitted]

A subcommittee was set up today to investigate whether there is any connection between the experts of the ministry inviting the tender and certain companies.

Hungary: Interior Minister Opposes Investigation Office

AU1004193996 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 10 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report on interview with Hungarian Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze; place and date of interview not given: "Kuncze Opposes the Special Investigation Office"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I fully agree with the prime minister that we must take a more efficient stand against the black economy than hitherto, Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze told MAGYAR HIRLAP on 9 April. Kuncze said that the government had not yet discussed the plans to set up a special investigation office within the Prime Minister's Office, and the coalition partners had not yet coordinated their positions on this matter either. Kuncze thinks it is inconceivable to set up a new organization led by a minister without portfolio, an office that could deal with issues without any justification.

As reported earlier, the Prime Minister's Office formulated a proposal to set up an investigation office. The proposal would give this new office the right to carry out investigations on any affair. According to plans, the new organization would be subordinated to a minister without portfolio appointed by the government.

Gabor Kuncze told us that fighting against the black economy is not only a police matter; the creation of adequate legal regulations is also part of this. Police, the Customs and Revenue Police [VPOP], and the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing [APEH] must be strengthened, and the coordination between the organizations involved in fighting against black economy and the ministers should also be improved. According to Gabor Kuncze, the aforementioned organizations have the necessary experts at their disposal. A new investigation office would only lure experts away from these organizations with promises of higher wages. Weakening these organizations cannot be a goal.

Answering to an observation according to which there is such a central investigation office in England too, Gabor Kuncze pointed out that the evaluation of this office is also controversial. In his view, the existing organizations possess the legal authority needed for an efficient stand against the black economy, and the district attorneys adequately supervise the investigations. Kuncze thinks that the debate on this issue should be carried out at the relevant government forums.

Gabor Kuncze told us that it is impossible to curb the black economy with actions; this can only be the result of a process lasting many years. Kuncze thinks that there is no reason for uncertainty among police, VPOP and APEH ranks because the government is not considering any proposal urging the creation of a central investigation office. In any case, Kuncze is certain that the government will only make decisions that are in harmony with the Constitution and the regulations in force.

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B-H: IFOR Notes 'Non-Compliance' With Weapons Accord

AU0904114996 Paris AFP in English 1136 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PALE, Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9 (AFP)—The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) has warned all the former warring parties in Bosnia they are in "non-compliance" with the Dayton agreement on weapons, a senior NATO officer said.

Brigadier Andrew Cumming, director of IFOR's joint operation centre, said NATO had sent a letter informing all the parties IFOR did not accept the information provided so far on the storage of air defence weapons.

"We have told all the parties they are in non-compliance," Cumming said at a briefing here.

Under the Dayton peace agreement, reached in negotiations last November, the Bosnian Moslem, Croat and Serb forces have to return all heavy weapons to designated collection points by April 18, 120 days after the signing of the peace treaty in Paris in December.

"Heavy weapons have to be locked up and accounted for, end of story," another IFOR officer said, adding "nobody is going to start flying back into Bosnia if there are a number of air defence systems loose in the country."

The figures so far provided on heavy weapons by the Bosnian government forces, the Bosnian Croat HVO and the Bosnian Serbs "do not tally with what we (IFOR) have seen," in practice, Cumming said.

One of the former factions had in January informed IFOR it had 46 air defence systems at a particular site, and more recently said it had 31. "We happen to have inspected 81 systems at the site ourselves," Cumming said.

He declined to name the faction involved.

Cumming said the discrepancies appeared to be "in part willful deception and in part a lack of accounting procedures from non-professional armies."

The British officer said that under the terms of the Dayton treaty "leverage can be put on the parties if they remain in non-compliance" but declined to give details.

Under the Dayton treaty, teams of international weapons inspectors have started a programme of weapons inspections across Bosnia. The results are to be reviewed in Vienna in June.

B-H: Brcko Serbs Protest IFOR Troops' Conduct

AU1004180096 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Brcko municipal assembly held a session today. Marko Draganic has a report:

[Draganic] The discussion mostly concerned the reports on last year's activity of public companies and state bodies, as well as plans for this year. All the reports were unanimously adopted except for the one on the activity of the Brcko radio and publishing public company, whose activity will be discussed at the next municipal assembly session, after the program for this year's activity is submitted.

In the discussion of the municipal budget for 1996, the [passage indistinct] because the money transfers service has not [words indistinct] budget for 1995. It is expected that this process will be completed by the end of this month, when it will be submitted to the [words indistinct]. Regarding the budget, particular attention was paid to collection of taxes from people employed abroad. It was emphasized that, in relation to 1994, (?the amount collected) was 42 percent higher [words indistinct].

Considering the increasingly frequent disapproval of the behavior of the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops on the part of the citizens of Brcko, which (?concerns force), the municipal officials were determined that the IFOR command be sent an appeal for this behavior to change. It was said that the troops should not be walking around town with their fingers on the triggers and that they should not patrol the town in tracked vehicles, as this causes considerable damage to the roads in the Brcko municipality. It was also stated that the Serb people of Posavina do not deserve to have to consider themselves uncivilized and this behavior of the IFOR soldiers is even more disturbing. [sentence as heard]

B-H: IFOR Removes 'Illegal' Checkpoints, Announces Talks

AU1004191496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The illegal checkpoints have been removed and abandoned checkpoints dismantled in the area of operations of the north and southwest multinational divisions. This was stated by Major Simon Haselock, IFOR [Implementation Force] Sarajevo spokesman, at a news conference today. He said that these actions have significantly improved the freedom of movement.

Haselock said that a preliminary meeting of the subcommission for determining the border between the entities

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will be held today, and that the representatives of the subcommission will visit the disputed areas tomorrow to try to find a compromise solution for these territories in the talks with the local population. He said that the final meeting of the subcommission, at which the final decision on the border should be made, will be held the day after tomorrow.

B-H: IFOR Battalion Raids Serb Police Station 9 Apr

LD1104101896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2230 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor, 10 Apr (SRNA)—At about 2000 (1800 GMT) yesterday evening members of the British IFOR [Implementation Force] battalion raided the border police station in Ostra Luka and took away 13 guns, two machine-guns, and a field radio station.

The police station, on the Prijedor-Sanski Most road (northwest Bosnia), was set up three months ago in line with the Dayton agreement.

The raid has caused indignation among the Ostra Luka villagers who, after two murders and a number of arrests and beatings of Serbs over the last two months by Muslim extremists dressed in police uniforms, are beginning to worry about their safety and have been thinking about moving.

A month ago, judge Nedjo Dosenovic was killed in the border area as he was trying to enter (Muslim-held) Sanski Most. Two families who returned to their homes in the border zone were detained and beaten up in the areas of Stara Rijeka and Tomina.

The Lazic family of Koprivna fared the worst. After two incidents in which first Mitar Lazic and then Savan Lazic were beaten up, their father Risto, a 70-year-old invalid, was killed on 3 April.

IFOR and the civilian international police force have done nothing in either of the cases thus encouraging the Muslims to commit fresh crimes and incidents, Serb radio and TV (Pale) said in its report.

B-H: Bildt Names Main Participants in Donor Conference

AU1004141096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of the Serb entity will take part in the donors' conference in Brussels on 12 and 13 April this year. This was stated today by Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community.

The government of the Serb entity yesterday afternoon complied fully with the deadline for the release of [words indistinct] set by my office, Bildt said.

According to him, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be represented at the donors' conference by a delegation consisting of Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Izudin Kapetanovic, prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Serb entity; as well as other representatives of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb entity.

Bildt said that this decision is in line with what had been agreed at the meeting of a joint commission in Banja Luka on 30 March this year.

All persons suspected by the parties of war crimes are in prisons in Sarajevo and Pale. They are accompanied at all times by representatives of the United Nations and the international police, Bildt added.

B-H: EC Confirms Serbs' Participation in Brussels

LD1004164796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1616 GMT 10 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, April 10 (TANJUG)—A European Commission [EC] spokesman said on Wednesday [10 April] that Republika Srpska's delegation (RS—the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina) would attend a donors' conference for Bosnia's reconstruction in Brussels on April 12-13.

The spokesman said that the RS delegation would be part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation, which would also include representatives of the Muslim-Croat federation and the Muslim government in Sarajevo.

The decision follows a statement by international community's high representative to Bosnia Carl Bildt that significant progress had been made in the exchange of prisoners which was a condition for the participation of the RS delegation in the Brussels conference.

The commission, which is the conference's organizer along with the World Bank, said that Bosnian Serbs had handed over to international organizations a group of prisoners charged with war crimes and submitted necessary documentation to The Hague Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

The conference is aimed at collecting 1.2 billion dollars, besides the 600 million dollars that have already been pledged, which are necessary for the reconstruction of Bosnia for this year.

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The conference will have 84 participants: the representatives of 55 countries and 29 international organizations, including financial institutions.

B-H: Kasagic: Formula for Brussels Attendance Unacceptable

LD1004182696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1803 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 10 Apr (SRNA)—[Bosnian] Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic today said that representatives of the Serb Republic could not attend the Brussels conference as part of the "delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Thanking High Representative Carl Bildt for the invitation, Kasagic said that the "proposed formula is unacceptable because the Dayton agreement does not envisage a joint body of Bosnia-Herzegovina until the elections are over."

"There are two entities—the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation—and the only link between them is the joint interim commission.

"For this reason, if representatives of the Serb Republic government go to Brussels we ask that they go as a separate delegation and be given the same treatment as the federation, in line with the Dayton agreement," said the prime minister of the Serb Republic.

In his letter [to Bildt], Kasagic said he was pleased that once again Bildt could see that the Serb Republic "kept its promise and fully complied with the agreement on POW release."

B-H: Brussels Conference To Proceed With or Without Serbs

AU1104075996 Paris AFP in English 0740 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 11 (AFP)—The aid and reconstruction conference due to start in Brussels Friday [12 April] will go ahead with or without the Bosnian Serbs, a spokesman for the top civilian official overseeing the peace process said Thursday.

Colum Murphy, spokesman for High Representative Carl Bildt, said that whether or not the Bosnian Serbs decide to attend "the conference goes ahead."

"It's their decision," he added.

Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said Wednesday they will refuse to attend the conference aimed at raising 1.2 billion dollars in reconstruction aid for Bosnia unless they can have their own delegation.

The World Bank and European Union, which are organising the conference, want the Serbs to participate in the conference but in a united delegation composed of one representative of the Sarajevo central government, another from the Serbs and a third from the Moslem-Croat federation.

The hardline Serb leadership is fiercely opposed to reintegration with the the rest of Bosnia and wishes to live as a separate state.

B-H: Brussels Conference Seen Giving Sarajevo Leverage

AU1104070996 Paris AFP in English 2357 GMT 10 Apr 96

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 11 (AFP)—Bosnia's fledgling central government will be able to block reconstruction funds going to the Bosnian Serbs if indicted Serb leaders do not quit politics, diplomats and bank officials said here Thursday [11 April].

Under an annex to an agreement signed between the Bosnian government and the World Bank, the central government in Sarajevo will have the keys to a 1.2 billion dollar kitty in reconstruction funds due to be pledged at a Brussels conference starting Friday.

"Bosnia is the state, and Sarajevo is the government. They get the money and that gives them a lot of leverage over the Serbs," said one western diplomat acquainted with the deal organised between Sarajevo and the Bank.

The donor conference, being held in Brussels Friday and Saturday by the Bank and the European Union, is aimed at raising 1.2 billion dollars in pledges of reconstruction aid, out of some 5.1 billion needed over the next three to four years.

One third of the cash is slated to go to the Bosnian Serbs.

The Bosnian Serbs announced however Wednesday they will refuse to take part in the conference if they have to go as part of a joint delegation from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Serbs fought their war to carve out an independent state in Bosnia and Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Pale-based Serb administration, said in a letter to top civilian official Carl Bildt it was unacceptable they be treated as one with the Moslems.

"If the representatives of the Republika Srpska are to go to Brussels, we demand to be represented separately and on the same footing as the Bosnia-Hercegovina federation, in conformity with the Dayton accords," he said.

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James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, pointed out when Bosnia joined the Bank on April 1 the World Bank is only allowed to deal with states and not with "entities" like the Republika Srpska.

Under the Dayton peace treaty, the government in Sarajevo is the representative of the state, he said. Bosnia, at the Brussels conference, will be treated as one state, he said.

Speaking to the official BH Press agency last week, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said the Bosnian government supported aid for the rebel Serbs as a means of reunifying the country.

However, he said, this was only if Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, both indicted war criminals, are removed from power.

Bosnia thinks aid to the Serbs "could contribute to the process of reintegration of the country but only under condition that Karadzic and Mladic be removed from power," the Bosnian president said.

"Unless they fulfil this condition, the aid would have the completely opposite effect," he added.

A western European diplomat who asked not to be named agreed and said Wednesday: "If you get the Bosnians putting a little pressure on the Serbs to get rid of Karadzic, you can't really say you didn't expect it.

"Of course, we all want to get rid of Karadzic," he added.

The World Bank assessment at the end of last month was that war destroyed "much of the physical infrastructure of the country and disrupted the economic systems that were in place."

From being one of the richest postcommunist states in eastern Europe in 1990, former Yugoslavia has crashed back into underdevelopment. Unemployment is estimated at 75 percent across the country and annual per capita income has fallen to about 500 US dollars as compared to 1,900 dollars in 1990.

War has made at least 90 percent of the population in the federation at least partly dependent on humanitarian food aid.

And in Serb-held territory, idle soldiers soon to demobilise complain of their economic deprivation and lack of jobs.

"There are going to be endless rows between the Serbs and Moslems, even between the Moslems and Croats, over the distribution of the international aid," said a western official involved in reconstruction efforts.

"It's going to go on for years," another said.

B-H: Serb War Crime Suspect Agrees To Face Hague Court

AU1004152096 Paris AFP in English 1417 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nuremberg, Germany, April 10 (AFP)—A Bosnian Serb accused of crimes against humanity has agreed to be handed over to the UN war crimes tribunal, a spokesman for the Nuremberg prosecutor's office said Wednesday [10 April].

Goran Lajic, 28, was arrested at Amberg in Bavaria on March 18.

A final formal decision to hand him over to the International Criminal Tribunal for the ex-Yugoslavia in The Hague now lies with the Federal German Government.

Lajic is accused of crimes against humanity and violation of customs and conventions in the conduct of war in a camp for war prisoners at Keraterm in northwest Bosnia.

As a warder at the prison camp he is said, together with three other accused, to have tortured and beaten to death between May 24 and August 30, 1992, numerous Bosnian Moslems and Croats of the Prijedor district whom he was supposed to guard.

B-H: Controversial Statements Seen in Hague Case

AU1004084496 Zagreb OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 Apr 96 pp 32-33

[Article by Ivan Sabic: "Muslims in The Hague as Well"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the latest charges of the International Tribunal for War Crimes Committed on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, raised on 22 March, are the names of four newly accused people, and among them for the first time members of the Muslim people, three of them in fact—Zejnil Delalic (48), Hazim Delic (32), and Esad Landzo called Zenga (23), whereas the fourth accused is Zdravko Mucic called Pavo (41), the eighth Croat accused of war crime. The number of the accused for crimes committed in the war in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus rose to 57, and the latest charges provoked general attention, not only because for the first time there were Muslims on the list of the accused, but also because it was for the first time that charges were raised before the international tribunal for crimes committed over Serbs.

Thus, with a long delay, the announcements of the international tribunal (publicly declared already last

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year), that accusations would also be raised against a group of Muslims, came true, but the accusation showed that the speculations (mostly from the press) about the names of the first indicted Muslims were wrong. For they claimed that first on that list would be the former commander of the defense of Srebrenica, Naser Oric, who has been claimed to be responsible for crimes committed over Serb civilians in the villages in the vicinity of the former Muslim enclave, and that immediately after Oric would be the names of the commanders of Muslim units from the neighborhood of Konjic, who are suspected of being responsible for crimes over the Croats from Konjic committed in 1993. The latest charges of the international tribunal showed that it was justified to believe that the Hague tribunal would for the time being give up the charges against Oric, since it would look "politically improper" to raise charges against someone who defended a town that has become one of the symbols of Muslim suffering and Serb ferocity.

In the accusation against the four mentioned it is said that Zejnil Delalic coordinated the Muslim-Croat units on the territory of Konjic from April to the end of September 1992, and from June to November of the same year he was the commander of the first tactical group of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and that the camp Celebici near Konjic, in which civilians of Serb nationality were detained, was under his responsibility. The second accused, Hazim Delic, according to the accusation, was the deputy commander from May to December 1992, and from November to the end of December also the commander of the camp in Celebici. From May to November, as is written in the accusation, the commander of the camp was Zdravko Mucic, whereas Esad Landzo was a guard in the Celebici camp from May to December of the same year.

Delalic's Escape From Bosnia-Herzegovina

All four of them have been accused of crimes against civilians of Serb nationality, who were prisoners in that camp, and they have also been charged with serious breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949, and the breach of law and of customs of war. Delic and Landzo have been charged for the killing of Scepo Gotovac, Simo Jovanovic, and Slavko Susic, and for two rapes and the maltreatment of prisoners. Besides, Delic has been charged for the killing of Zeljko Milosevic, and Landzo for the killing of Bosko Samoukovic and of one person whose last name only is known—Miljanic.

In the accusation it is said that Delalic, Mucic, and Delic were superior to all guards and other persons who had access to the camp in Celebici, and as such they have been charged for the killing of at least 14 prisoners, at least seven tortures, five cases of inflicting severe pain and three cases of inhuman treatment of prisoners.

The Hague tribunal has access to at least two of those four: Zejnil Delalic was arrested in Munich several days before the charges were raised, Zdravko Mucic was arrested on the same day in Vienna, whereas the first information about Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo said that they were still free in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the authorities there guaranteed that the two accused would be arrested and given over to the tribunal. However, according to other, quite reliable, information, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo have been in prison in Bosnia-Herzegovina since January 1994, sentenced for murder, Delic to 10 and Landzo to eight years in prison, but those sentences do not refer to the criminal deeds for which the International Tribunal for War Crimes charges them. According to that information, they were sentenced at the court martial in Konjic for the killing of Esad Bubalo, committed in June 1992, allegedly upon the order of the commander of the camp in Celebici, Zdravko Mucic, who was tried in absence in Konjic. According to a third variant, Hazim Delic, whose sentence was reduced to seven and a half years after an appeal, came out of the prison recently, after the amnesty was proclaimed.

What the investigators and the prosecutor of the international tribunal do not find particularly interesting is the fact that Delalic left Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of November 1992, and settled in Austria—after he had come into a conflict with the leadership of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and was accused of financial malversation and embezzlement. There was mention of 20 million German marks from the Konjic plant "Igman," and an embezzlement of half a million marks. The media published stories about Delalic's connections with UDBA and KOS [Serbian secret services], about his conspiratory name Nil, his intentional endangering of the defense of Konjic, liberation of prisoners of Serb nationality under suspicious circumstances (for money), his name was linked with the killing of Esad Bubalo.... A group of officers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was arrested in Konjic at that time, including the present general and the then colonel Jovan Divjak, whereas Delalic escaped the arrest; when he left Bosnia-Herzegovina and arrived in Vienna, stories appeared that he had left Konjic in a Serb military helicopter, and that he had come to Vienna via Belgrade. Arif Pasalic, at that time the commander of the 4th (Mostar) Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, accused him of having "influenced the morale of the soldiers, reduced the effectiveness of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and incited conflicts with the HVO units."

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Blaming of Daidza

He himself later denied all those accusations, with the help of some Croatian papers and journalists, claiming that they had been created by those who wanted to provoke the Croat-Muslim conflict, that he had gone to Vienna to finish some work concerning the firm he had had there before the war, but he had not been able to go back since a posse had set out for him. He declared all the stories about a Serb military helicopter as meaningless; according to his version, he had gone to Vienna in a car, passing through 11 checkpoints of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO. "If somebody had wanted they could have stopped me," those are the words with which he proved his innocence in February 1993, and it was only recently that he said he had gone through all those checkpoints with documents in the name of Stjepan Kozul. Today, with the help of the Muslim media, he claims that Muslims committed no crime in Bradina, and he accuses General Daidza and Croatian soldiers of having burnt down all the houses in that village, except the house of Ante Pavelic [Ustasha leader in World War II].

The accusation that was raised against Delalic and the remaining three by the prosecutor of the international tribunal is, among others, based on the testimony of the former prisoners of the camp in Celebici. The investigation of the whole case was initiated at the end of 1994, but it went slowly, and because the regimes in Belgrade and in Pale refused to cooperate with the international tribunal, and did not allow their investigators to take statements from witnesses, Milosevic and Karadzic practically postponed the raising of the charges. Finally, the witnesses gave testimonies in the Romanian town of Timisoara, over a month ago. According to the statement of the director of the Fund for Humanitarian Law from Belgrade, Natasa Kandic, given to a journalist from RADIO FREE EUROPE, a small number of witnesses stated that in the Celebici camp around 25 people were killed, and that around 15 people were killed between 25 and 26 May in the immediate vicinity of Konjic in the village of Bradina. The Fund for Humanitarian Law possesses information, apparently unconfirmed, that there is a mass grave near the Orthodox church in that village.

Indictment as a Mistake

However, in Konjic the arrest of Zejnil Delalic and Zdravko Mucic, and the accusation against the four men from Konjic, is seen as "a mistake that it will not be hard to prove." That is at least what is written in the Sarajevo-based biweekly paper SLOBODNA BOSNA, which also quotes the citizens' statements, all of whom talk about four victims in the prison in Celebici: Pero Mrkaljic, who is said to have died of diabetes, Simo Jovanovic, who allegedly died of a heart attack, Zeljko Klimenta, who, it is claimed, was killed while attempting to flee, and the already mentioned Esad Bubalo, and they claim that these were the only cases of death in the camp.

"Konjic is a town that is often shelled, and the sports hall (which at one time served as a prison—author's comment) is very near the front line. Unlike the civilian population, who could hide in the shelters during the shelling, the prisoners had to stay in the hall unprotected. On 5 June 1992 a shell fell on the sports hall, killing 13, and wounding 27 prisoners." That is in one report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, written on 26 August 1992 by an official from that organization, Michael Mooser. After that the prisoners were moved to Celebici, and today it is not clear whether those 13 victims of the artillery attack are included in the total number of victims mentioned in the charges against Delalic, Delic, Landzo and Mucic. If it is, that would certainly be one of the points in which the defenders of the accused could look for a way out, and in that way try not only to defend their clients but also to reduce the big political significance of the fact that three Muslims have been accused of war crime.

SLOBODNA BOSNA writes that nobody in Konjic believes in the number of victims mentioned in the international organizations' reports, but, just as Delalic is trying to blame Daidza for the events of Bradina, it writes that it will be necessary to "discuss the frequent visits of soldiers of the Croat brigade in the prison in Celebici." However, if the killings that are mentioned in the witnesses' statements, on whose basis the charges have been raised, are proved, the accused will hardly be able to defend themselves by blaming possible visitors to the prison, because the prosecutor could easily prove that those who allowed these visitors access are also responsible for their presence and possible crimes.

B-H: Lawyer: Police Prevent Visit to Jailed Serb Colonel

LD1004190596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1725 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 10 Apr (SRNA)—The [Bosnian] federal police today prevented lawyer Igor Pantelic from visiting [client] Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, who is in Sarajevo's Muslim prison.

In a statement for SRNA, Pantelic said "he could not visit Krsmanovic at the agreed time because the checking of documents took an unjustifiably long time, although the arrival was reported to the judge of the high court of enquiry, Izet Bazdarevic."

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"The federal police stopped my car in the city center. With me in the car was Colonel Krsmanovic's brother Jovo Krsmanovic as well as a team from Belgrade's VECERNJE NOVOSTI," said Pantelic, adding:

"A large group of people, yelling abuses such as 'What is this Chetnik lawyer doing here?' and 'They should all be killed,' shouting and spitting, surrounded the car. There was not adequate intervention from the police, and I was prevented from carrying out my duty as defense lawyer."

According to Pantelic, "this was a crude violation of one of the important principles of the Dayton agreement—freedom of movement—and we shall file a protest to Carl Bidlt, IFOR [Implementation Force] command and the international police."

The Belgrade lawyer, after intervention from IFOR, which allegedly could not guarantee his safety, had to abandon his visit and leave the Muslim part of Sarajevo.

B-H: Serbs Say Humanitarian Situation 'Catastrophic'

LD1004150996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1358 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 Apr (SRNA)—The humanitarian situation in the Serb Republic is catastrophic, particularly after the Dayton agreement, because aid deliveries have been halved from 8,000 to 4,000 tonnes monthly.

Dragan Kekic, Serb Republic commissioner for refugees, confirmed this to SRNA today and warned that the situation has been made even more difficult by the the exodus of 85,000 Sarajevo Serbs. They have been accommodated in 35 refugee reception center, Kekic said and added that most had been accommodated in Lukavica—18,000, Biljeljina and Visegrad—10,000, Zvornik—8,000, and Bratunac—7,000.

Most of the Serb refugees, victims of the previous exodus, are in Banja Luka—85,000, Prijedor—40,000, Bijeljina—37,000, Zvornik—34,000, Brcko—26,000, Doboj—25,000, Gradiska and Laktasi—14,000, Srebrenica—11,000, and Trebinje—11,000, he said.

According to Kekic, the situation has been further exacerbated by UNHCR's decision to stop delivering food to the Serb Republic from this month onwards, so that aid deliveries can now be expected from the World Food Program only.

International aid organizations were responsible for 64 percent of aid deliveries to the Serb Republic in 1995, while the rest was supplied by the Yugoslav Red Cross and our citizens living abroad.

B-H: CIA Said Supporting Serb Independent Deputy Dodik

AU0904093896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by Nikola Zeklic: "Dancing to the CIA's Rhythm"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mile [Milorad] Dodik, Ante Markovic's former "reformist" and the leader of the opposition's caucus of independent deputies in the Assembly of the Serb Republic [RS], recently set up the "independent" Social Democratic Party of the Serb Republic, shouting from the rooftops that the party's founders were, above all, the independent deputies from the RS Assembly. Unfortunately for him, none of them have joined the new party, nor, as they claim themselves, have they any intention of doing so. On the contrary, recently they all started running away from Mile Dodik.

The former president of the Executive Council of Laktasi Municipality has therefore found himself in the lurch and with the burden of NEZAVISNE NOVINE, printed in Banja Luka. Why did Ratko Borkovic, Goran Popovic, Milenko Pantic, Momo Micic... distance themselves from him?

First and foremost, the reason lies in the assessment by Dodik's associates that he is no longer independent and is more than dependent on some forces outside the RS, and outside of Yugoslavia. To be more precise, a story has been spread that he is under the direct control of the U.S. intelligence service, the CIA. Some individuals from the "remaining" section of the caucus of independent deputies say that he has already traveled abroad several times for consultations and direct instructions. For instance, in the last two months alone, he visited Sweden regularly. This is why they are particularly afraid of carrying on working with him, especially in the newly founded Social Democratic Party of the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

To Whom Does NEZAVISNE NOVINE Belong?

These are the reasons why the majority of people in the RS are distancing themselves from Dodik. As is the fact that Dodik has virtually no access to the state leadership of Serbia and its president any longer. It is obvious that he, too, has heard the rumors about Dodik's double games and machinations that he was involved in during the war, in the RS and in Serbia.

NEZAVISNE NOVINE, or rather the newspaper's ownership, is the story in itself. Formally, the editorial posts are held by two "firm Serbs."

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However, those who are better informed claim that the paper is edited from Belgrade by a completely different person. In the meantime, the paper's editorial office, accommodated in the apartment of one of the founding members of the SDS [Social Democratic Party], who is still a member of the SDS Main Committee, is staffed according to the system that existed in the former Yugoslavia. There are a Croat woman, a Slovene women, as well as Mehmed Dizdar, Zinaida Sahic....

It is interesting to note that the permanent guests of NEZAVISNE NOVINE are IFOR [Implementation Force] officers and a large number of the world's "humanitarian" organizations.

On his regular visits to Sweden in the past few months, Mile Dodik, by the look of it, has solved the financial problem of his newspaper. There are rumors that money is arriving via Carl Bildt, who, with the help of the United States and the CIA, is well into founding numerous "independent media." Presently, Dodik's newspaper suits him the most.

So, the Social Democrats have been left with only a few members, the Dodik family, and the NEZAVISNE NOVINE editorial board.

B-H: Croats Complain of Muslim Provocation, Intimidation

LD1004195496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The few Croats who have returned to Travnik Municipality have been subjected to provocations and intimidation by the remaining mojahedin. The [Bosnian Croat] Travnik Municipal Council, with its seat in Nova Bila, has sent a letter to representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the international community. Zvonimir Cilic reports:

[Cilic] The group of about 1,000 Croats left in Travnik following the July 1994 exodus marked Easter in a peaceful and dignified way, hopeful that they will be able to restore normal life, in general, and that about 20,000 displaced Croats will be allowed to return to Travnik and the municipality.

However, a number of incidents over Easter indicates that freedom of movement in some parts of the municipality is nothing more than a futile dream, Travnik municipal authorities say in their letter to the president of the [Croat-Muslim] federation, Kresimir Zubak, the presidential council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the commissioner for refugees of the Republic of Croatia, Damir Zoric, the international police office, and the EU Observer Mission. Freedom of movement is being obstructed by some foreign, Arab citizens, who humiliated and offended the people of Guca Gora on this Catholic holiday, the letter says. The letter goes on to illustrate the point by citing only two out of several recent incidents.

Pero Rajic was chased away from outside his house, now occupied by a Muslim family, by an Arab wielding a gun. The Arab spoke bad Bosnian and is part of a group of dozens of Arabs remaining in this part of Travnik Municipality.

Following the Easter mass three brothers from the Petrusic family wanted to have a look at their old house now occupied by Hamza, a mojahedin notorious among the Croats for his evil deeds. Accompanied by two other Arabs and two local Muslims Hamza kept the three brothers Petrusic against their will for a whole hour threatening and insulting them. His message to them was: You can return to Guca Gora only when it is in your hands again.

The letter speaks about indignation among the Guca Gora refugees and the Croats of central Bosnia at the reign of fear practiced by the mojahedin in the area. The letter asks if the Muslim side has any intention of complying with the Dayton agreement and, if so, when will it remove these foreigners who represent a constant threat to the Croats and peace in the area. Travnik has gained the reputation of having done most for ensuring that the federation has begun to function and, by implication, freedom of movement. However, the Croats are still not allowed to visit their old homes or, on their religious holidays, their cemeteries, for instance in the village of Bukovica or let alone in the Croat village of Orasac, the headquarters of the remaining Arabs. The letter also contains an appeal to remove the demobilized mojahedin from the area and try them for the crimes they committed in the area.

B-H: Muslims Said Preventing Return of Croats to Jablanica

LD1004171996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of around 50 Muslims led by several army conscripts have made an incursion into the Croat-controlled village of Doljani in the Jablanica municipality [south of Sarajevo]. A civilian police patrol stopped the group and sent it back to Jablanica.

As we have learned from Ivan Rogic, chairman of the Jablanica municipal committee of the Croatian Democratic Union, a group of Muslims-Bosniaks opened fire in Jablanica on Easter, intimidating local population.

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Muslim-Bosniak authorities do not even want to hear about the return of Croat families to the municipality of Jablanica, Rogic said, stressing that this last incident could be linked with a session of an interim municipal council of Jablanica on 8 April when two Croat councillors' mandate was revoked. Croats will not tolerate such incidents, Rogic said, and will do everything to protect their interests in this area, Habena has reported.

B-H: Occupation of Mostar by Croatian Police Feared

96BA0234A Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 p 10

[Article by Muamer Cerimagic: "When Koschnick Goes, the Croatian Army Might Attack Mostar?!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This little piece of world history in which the drama of the Bosnian state is playing out represents the saddest time for the idea of Europe as a political community. The summit meeting in Rome clearly confirmed the prostitute's passion with which the Old Lady preaches its Balkan frigidity and betrays principles by which even a whore abides.

Mostar is the most obvious example of the helplessness of Europe to halt Croatian nationalism, but that helplessness is a matter of fakery and pretense. Croatia had only to be threatened with sanctions for Mostar to get that measure of integrity which would guarantee the Bosniaks that they would not be ghettoized on the east bank. But that did not happen: A concession was made in order to obtain a guarantee of Zagreb's support for the project of the federation "in its entirety," and that constituted one of the biggest mistakes of European diplomacy.

There is no doubt that Zagreb will interpret the message quite differently from the way the European Union expects: The concession made to the Croats on the issue of Mostar will be seen by Banski Dvori as an opportunity to continue to obstruct everything that has been agreed to. That is, the federation will not become full-blown, but will continue to stagnate, as confirmed by the rallies organized in central Bosnia. A people happening—similar to what the Serbs did when the war began. When Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be recognized, the Serbs went to war. Now something similar is happening with Croatian policy: When the federation is to be implemented, rallies are organized in support of Herzeg-Bosna, and there is no doubt that the federation still remains only one of Tudjman's most frequent words, but it is essentially irrelevant in his political vocabulary.

"The People Happening"

The arrival of the Croatian police in Mostar seems the biggest mistake of our policy, even though the intentions were very good. There is no doubt that the Croatian police will now behave as masters and that the police from Mostar will be on the payroll of the Croatian police, just as the Serbian officers in Bosnia are on Belgrade's payroll.

The question which hangs like a sword of Damocles over Bosnian politics is whether we should have given in on the issue of Mostar and whether we have received any concessions if the Croats, even after a reduction of the district's size, do not resume work on the project of the federation. There are no concessions, because the international community has already taken for granted the departure of the Serbs from the occupied opcinas of Sarajevo as the largest possible concession to the Bosniaks. Banja Luka, Mostar, and Sarajevo are the three pivotal ethnic cities, one for each nationality, and this is a decision which Europe has already made.

The talk about multiethnic Sarajevo and Mostar is a fairy tale. Koschnick's support was only masturbation on paper of an unconvincing diplomacy. Dayton really divided Bosnia into three parts, not two, and if the federation does not succeed, Europe will not move a finger. The Croats know that.

At the same time, Croatia is the most important American player in this region. Susak's trip to Washington at the height of the Mostar unrest clearly emphasizes that in Washington's eyes Bosnia is only an administrative entity which should surely be preserved, but without Bosniak domination and with pronounced reliance on Croatia.

What Comes After Koschnick

In that situation, then, the mayor of Mostar had no choice but to submit his resignation. First came the public execution of Safa Orucevic by a firing squad consisting of the police and the journalists, and the sins of his youth became commonplace in the Croatian press, and along with everything else they associated the cultivation of marijuana in Herzegovina with that man. The objective is clear—to break down that robust man by every possible means in hopes of finding a partner on the Bosniak side who will be spineless like the prewar leaders of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]—Hadziosmanovic. But in the end, Safa will most probably have to withdraw his resignation, and Mostar will continue to be the only city in the world with two or three mayors. And when Koschnick leaves, and that is no longer very far off, anything is possible.

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If even a minimum opportunity of real reintegration of Mostar "threatens," the Croatian Army, if it judges that it could occupy all of Mostar in a blitzkrieg, will do so. In any case, there must not be a repetition of '93, when the Command of the Bosnian Army fell easily in the center of Mostar. If it had not, much of all this would have been different....

B-H: UNHCR Protests FRY's Detention of 13 Bosnians

AU1004151396 Paris AFP in English 1433 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Report by Kevin McElderry]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kalesija, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 10 (AFP)—More than 200 Moslem men returned to Bosnia on Wednesday [10 April] after fleeing Bosnian Serb troops in a cross-country trek and more than eight months in a detention centre in Serbia.

The UN lodged a "strong protest," an official said, after 13 of the Moslems' fellow internees at the centre at Sljivovica in Serbia were held back by Serbian authorities at the last minute.

The group of 211, all men of draft age, fled the former Moslem enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa after they were seized by Bosnian Serb forces in July last year.

They said they walked through hills and woods for several days to reach the Drina River on the border with Serbia before swimming or drifting across on pieces of wood.

Many of their friends died during the gruelling hike after being strafed by Bosnian Serb aircraft and gunfire. Some were killed by Serbian army soldiers on the other side of the Drina, they said.

There were tears as the men met friends they had fought alongside to defend Zepa and who had managed to escape separately. One of them was army captain Nazif Podzic, who hugged and kissed the men as they arrived.

"This is a moment for history," he said.

Some of the refugees said conditions in Sljivovica were bad, while others said they were fed three times a day and that no one tried to escape.

Alija Karga, 48, said: "We had three meals a day but we couldn't go out and we had to ask even if we wanted to go to the toilet. It was not a refugee camp, it was a detention camp."

He said he and a group of some 120 others began their trek to Serbia as Zepa was being captured on July 29.

"It was dangerous, but we had to go. We didn't have time to think about the Serbs. We didn't have any weapons but they shot at us from aircraft and helicopters.

"A lot of people didn't get across but my group did. Some of those who died were killed after they crossed the Drina by the Serbian army [FRY army]."

He said he crossed the Drina clinging to a piece of wood. Now he was looking forward to meeting his wife, who has resettled near Zenica.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Randolf Ryan denounced the detention of the remaining 13 in Sljivovica as "an outrageous piece of last-minute baloney."

Ryan said Serbian authorities had demanded the 13 people due to board the buses to Bosnia should be held back for "further investigation."

"The UNHCR has protested strongly...and is pursuing the matter at the highest level in Geneva, Sarajevo and Belgrade," he said.

"We were given no warning at all. The authorities have known since last summer who was in the camp and were shown the list three weeks ago. There is no reason that I can see to hold these people back."

The Serbian authorities deny they are holding the refugees under prison conditions at Sljivovica. An official of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Laurent Fellay, said, however, the men were clearly "internees" at the site.

The refugees, travelling in six buses, crossed back into Bosnian government-held territory at a checkpoint near here, 30 kilometres (18 miles) east of Tuzla. The trip was organised by the UNHCR.

They were transferred at the checkpoint onto other buses for journeys to Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica.

Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, speaking to reporters in Sarajevo, said the Bosnian Government was seeking to find out why the 13 Moslems were still being detained in Sljivovica.

"According to the information I have, 13 remained in the camp in Sljivovica and 211 people reached Bosnia.

"We were not told about the reason why the 13 remained. We are investigating that right now, through the people who helped the detainees to reach Bosnia," he said.

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B-H: Muratovic Addresses Assembly on Government Goals

AU1004134096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0645 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Address by Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the 18th Session of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Words indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina that has been submitted to you has been drafted using documents submitted at the time when this government was appointed. It is based on the government's obligations and authorities, experience and priorities that we have set ourselves for this period. Allow me to reiterate these priorities because they form the basis for individual tasks listed in the program before you.

Our first goal is to establish a legal framework for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its constituent elements. The second goal is the implementation of the peace agreement, and the third goal is economic revival, that is, creating conditions for accommodating the population and the normalization of life. Each of these goals requires us to carry out an immense number of tasks and to undertake a large-scale coordination of interests within the Federation on the one hand, and the international community on the other. It moreover requires the mobilization of immense material and human potential and a change in attitude. Allow me to make a brief presentation of the program, in the order listed in the document submitted to you.

1. Legal and General (?Instructions)

The activities which the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be implementing with the help of the Justice and General Administration [Opca uprava] Ministry constitute one of the foundations of Bosnia-Herzegovina's organization. The Dayton accord has established new principles and it stipulates the establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina's legal system along new lines. There are two major groups of tasks in this area:

a) the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

b) creation of living conditions.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly has already adopted the law on the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and ministries, while at today's session we shall review the Law on Administration Services at state level. The objective of these legal projects is to establish an efficient organization which will successfully carry out tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina's jurisdiction, and strengthen its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international [word indistinct], while at the same time defining the entities' legal system, and to establish an appropriate administration at all levels. We are committed to making the Federation function as soon as possible. Following this, we will assess the functioning of the remaining Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions and propose appropriate (?systems). The other goal—preparation of elections of the Bosnia-Herzegovina bodies as stipulated by the constitution—is well on its way. The elections, from local to state level, are a prerequisite for the further implementation of the constitution. The government will draft a detailed program that will set out all the activities pertaining to the elections, and it will join in creating conditions for holding democratic elections. One of the prerequisites for holding elections is freedom of movement and the right of refugees and displaced persons to return home. Our cooperation with the International Tribunal in The Hague, and our demands submitted to the international community regarding the discovery and prosecution of war crimes suspects, will be doubly significant, namely, punishment of the criminals, and the creation of conditions for democratic elections. That is why we have [words indistinct].

Until the establishment of federal institutions for carrying out tasks formerly carried out by the single Justice Ministry, we shall have to deal with these tasks and transfer them to the Federation, and later, to the Serb entity. This particularly pertains to the judiciary. In the search for solutions to these problems we must not allow a breakdown in the continuity of authority implementation.

2. Foreign Affairs

The basic direction of our foreign policy pertains to the further development of international cooperation, legal recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by states that have still not recognized us, establishment of diplomatic relations, and the implementation of the peace agreement. Our goals are clear and they form the basis for our program and the tasks it necessitates. We wish to join European integration processes as soon as possible through membership in the Council of Europe, Partnership for Peace, the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, and EU associate (?membership). Our particular interest is to cooperate with countries, friends of the Federation, and to continue building friendly and economic relations with the Republic of Croatia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and to initiate normalization of relations with Serbia and Montenegro. We shall pay particular attention to building our relations with the United States, whose contribution to the implementation of the peace agreement is immense. We shall continue to develop cooperation with Islamic countries through the

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Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] and bilateral relations, and direct them toward economic cooperation. As far as multilateral relations are concerned, we shall continue to monitor global political trends, and actively cooperate with the United Nations through its specialized organizations from which we expect greater engagement in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and humanitarian aid. We have heretofore taken detailed steps in the reorganization of the Foreign Ministry, and we have initiated a reorganization of its personnel structures. We have completed several significant tasks at the multilateral and bilateral level. We have signed and endorsed a large number of multilateral and bilateral contracts, and we shall continue in this vein.

Allow me to use the occasion to stress that we are now in a period when a large number of international organizations and their representatives are present in the area, as well as intelligence services. Some of them are sending reports which are neither accurate nor well-meaning, and which are causing us great diplomatic damage. Representatives of certain domestic non-govermental organizations who do not share our goals go abroad and are received by influential personages whom they provide with inaccurate information, causing us great damage.

Lately, we have witnessed the appearance of extremely malicious and inaccurate texts regarding our country in states that are well acquainted with us, who used to be important economic partners, and who know the truth about us. We must all strive to maintain and further our reputation in the world through our Foreign Ministry, and to prevent such actions irrespective of who initiates them. Our political reputation is a condition for our economic recovery.

3. Refugees and Displaced Persons

Bosnia-Herzegovina's main activities in resolving the issue of the status and return of refugees, and care for citizens who permanently reside outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be directed toward:

a) the creation of conditions for the return and resettlement of refugees;

b) collection of donations, and

c) cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina expatriates.

With the goal of realizing these tasks, we shall continue activities on securing the international community's necessary support. In this respect we shall continue to develop relations with the UNHCR as the [word indistinct] and comprehensive repatriation, and the international organization for migrations in order to organize expert personnel [sentence as heard]. You are aware of the fact that we have initiated a major project in cooperation with them. Moreover, we shall continue cooperation with a group of countries for the realization of aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina formed by the OIC, known under the name of AMG [aid mobilization group], which will provide concrete aid in creating conditions for return, as well as with other international organizations.

We shall carry on with activities pertaining to the signing and realization of bilateral agreements on repatriation which, in addition to concrete help for meeting the costs of organized transport, the procurement of basic household goods, and direct financial aid [words indistinct] secure a part of the funds for the reconstruction of housing facilities and the creation of employment conditions for returning refugees. The host countries will enable the founding and support the work of the office for the repatriation of our refugees that is active in these countries [word indistinct]. In contacts with international factors authorized for issues pertaining to repatriation, the government will insist on the consistent implementation of the principle according to which everyone has a right to return home, both on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb entity. We expect to repatriate some 150,000 to 200,000 refugees during this year, and we shall organize ourselves accordingly. Of course, this means that the necessary political and security conditions will have been met.

In order to secure donations that will create conditions for the population's survival, as well as conditions for the reconstruction of the country, the government will undertake measures to comprehensively inform the [word indistinct] donors regarding the needs, the type, and the quantity of aid for the entire population, and ways of securing the donations. In this respect, we shall organize appropriate promotional activities and establish cooperation with international organizations and certain countries, and prepare various agreements and protocols for signing. We expect that this will secure humanitarian aid through the UNHCR, the World Food Fund, AMG, and other international organizations amounting to 23,000 metric tons per month in foodstuffs, some $180 million for creating conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons, and a part of the 100 million German marks needed for the return of expert and talented personnel, the opening of new jobs, and part of the repair of housing facilities. [Words indistinct]

With the goal of securing as close a cooperation as possible, and finding new forms of cooperation with [words indistinct], we shall undertake measures to found new and acquaint ourselves with the existing associations of our citizens. Various projects will strengthen ties with the homeland, and will provide an opportunity for in-

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forming the diaspora particularly about concrete forms of aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the ways of realizing it. We shall try to create an objective image of the country by launching certain [word indistinct] activities and establish close ties with the homeland. We shall continue to monitor the realization of minority rights abroad, particularly in former Yugoslav countries, through regular contacts with legitimate representatives of our minorities in these countries; we shall moreover undertake measures to protect their minority rights.

All these activities have already been launched. I believe that you have been informed about the organized and constant return of refugees; we have already signed two bilateral agreements, and three are close to signing; building material for the repair of homes can already be obtained in some places free of charge, and preparations are in progress for projects pertaining to [words indistinct]. You were also acquainted with the fact that as of today, we have [word indistinct] refugee camp in western Bosnia, in Croatia, together with the Croatian government.

4. Finances

[Words indistinct] of finances in the coming period will be based on the implementation of the peace agreement's basic principles signed in Dayton. The role of the Finance Ministry will be realized through the strengthening of the state's money mass, economic sovereignty, integration of [words indistinct], and through the establishment of a single state customs system and policy. One of the most important tasks of the Finance Ministry is managing the amount of money in circulation and administrating the state's foreign currency balance, which will be realized through a policy of [word indistinct] banking and loan [word indistinct]. From an operational standpoint, we shall realize the set goals [words indistinct] listed in the program. Strengthening the economic revival and the financial situation in the country is possible by taking more foreign loans and by reaching a favorable settlement of earlier debts.

The Finance Ministry's concrete task is to join, that is, to create conditions for joining international institutions. As you know, we have already successfully completed a part of these tasks when we joined the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was done a couple of days ago. We now have to resolve the issue of debt with the Paris and London clubs. We held a large-scale, international, informative conference on economic reconstruction here in Sarajevo. We moreover prepared the OIC Contact Group summit which is taking place in Sarajevo today. We have prepared the donors' conference scheduled to take place in Brussels three days from now. After resolving the issue of debt with the World Bank, new loans have been put at our disposal; we have signed a total of four contracts, and we are working on new projects. We still have to do a lot of work on the realization of loans, that is, on the reception of comprehensive economic aid. [sentence as heard] In Brussels, we expect to receive donations amounting to $1.2 billion for this year.

As far as the customs system and policy is concerned, the main tasks are to establish a single customs system throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on this, we need to draft customs regulations which pertain to customs policy and [words indistinct], and privileges, and adjust it to new conditions stipulated by the Dayton accord. We need to draft legislation which will regulate a special customs regime in certain areas, for example, [words indistinct] and local border trade. We need to develop much greater cooperation between the small number of experts in the republican and federal governments. This cooperation has heretofore proven to be problematic.

In addition to the above tasks, we also need to continue work on the organization of the central bank, the banking system, and insurance system. These are the main tasks in the area of finances, which the [words indistinct].

Finally, allow me to say that certain inaccurate texts and statements regarding the dinar have appeared in the press, made by certain people [words indistinct]. The dinar is the main means of payment. You will be able to buy everything for dinars. We shall continue to maintain [words indistinct] the German mark. Everything else is just speculation aimed at making a quick profit. You have seen that the dinar was stable even during the war. If we were capable of maintaining its value in the war, the citizens should know that we shall maintain it in peace. This is our firm commitment. Therefore, go on earning dinars, and the state will make sure that you can buy everything for dinars, from consumer goods to [words indistinct]. So far, only those who sold the dinar in the (?streets) [words indistinct].

5. Foreign Trade and International Communication

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Communication is facing outstanding tasks of establishment of (?schemes of international traffic transport), conclusion of bilateral contracts in the field of [words indistinct], creation of measures for protecting the domestic market, and extending aid to the reconstruction of [words indistinct]. Certain projects regarding transport and telecommunications have already been completed with international institutions, and their realization is supposed to begin, but there still remains a huge job to be done in this field.

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Our fundamental guidelines concerning our work are, in addition to various ministries of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, engagement in particular projects together with the government of the Federation. In that sense, we shall continue our work on defining a strategy of economic development in Bosnia-Herzegovina, privatization, job creation, and settlement of other (?crucial) problems of this state. We are sure that our priorities are well chosen, and if we successfully complete the tasks of this program, we shall make an appropriate step in the organization of the state and settlement of some key problems of the current time. Thank you.

B-H: Krajisnik, Steiner Discuss POW Release Problems

LD0904155996 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Michael Steiner, a member of Bildt's team for the implementation of the Dayton agreement, had talks in Pale today about the problem of POW's, whose release was one of the conditions for the donors' conference for the reconstruction of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation. Vesna Stakic reports:

[Stakic] Mr. Krajisnki, speaker of the Serb Republic parliament, said after the meeting that the talks today had covered POW's accused by the Serb side of war crimes. He went on:

[Begin Krajisnik recording] We told Mr. Steiner that we have handed over relevant documentation on the POW's and that these documents have been delivered to a certain location. We have not collected documents relating to three POW's whom we nevertheless consider to be war criminals. Since these documents have not been forwarded by the court that detained them, we have decided to release these three POW's, and Mr. Steiner will today carry out the transfer of the POW's.

I must admit that we were slightly surprised by the claims that the Serbs had failed to fulfill their obligations. We have released all POW's. In the case of the ones we accused of war crimes, we have handed over relevant documentation. The three we consider war criminals, we will hand them over today, thus fulfilling all our obligations.

We object to the fact that Mr. Krsmanovic has not been treated in the way we expected. The other side cannot send a person to The Hague tribunal as it sees fit. This can happen again and again. We were promised that this could not happen and that once The Hague tribunal had had its say, the Krsmanovic case would be closed.

We also object to the fact that a large number of POW's have not been released from prisons in Croatia. We have a list which we gave to the Red Cross, the international community, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These POW's were captured on the western front in an offensive by the regular Croatian army. We also want to draw attention to the long list of POW's from Serb Krajina imprisoned in Croatia. We want to say publicly that the other two sides have not fulfilled their obligations. [end recording]

[Stakic] The deputy high representative of the international community said that he was encouraged by what Speaker Krajisnik had to say and that the implementation of the Dayton agreement provision on POW's was proceeding in the right direction. Asked what the international community would do over the release of Serb prisoners from Muslim and Croat prisons, Mr. Steiner said:

[Begin Steiner recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] We have the release of 28 prisoners plus 18, as you know, and others in the hands of the international police. The [Hague] tribunal is investigating these cases and will make a decision soon. The sides will have to respect that decision. [end recording]

[Stakic] Asked what is happening with Colonel Krsmanovic, who was freed by The Hague tribunal, Steiner said that the international community is treating all cases equally.

As a sign of goodwill the Serb side today released Hasan Hrnadovic, Kemal Alagic, and Enver Hrasic.

B-H: Serb POW Names Head of Government 'Special Police'

AU0904141696

[FBIS Summary] Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian in its 5 April edition on pages 18 and 19 carries a 2,000-word interview with Ninko Djuric, a correspondent of the Bosnian Serb newspaper JAVNOST, who was captured by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on Mt. Ozren in June 1994. Djuric tells interviewer Marica Lalovic about his mistreatment in Bosnian captivity and, while describing his stay in the Husinska Buna barracks, identifies one of his interrogators as "Ilijas Suceska, the commander of their special police force."

Djuric also mentions the existence of "a mujahidin" training camp in the village of Meskovici near Kalesija, without providing any additional information about it.

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B-H: Minister on 'Contribution' by Special Police

AU0904151896 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by "N.C.": "Armed Forces Are the Guarantor of the Survival of Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 Apr—Our armed forces are the guarantor of our survival in this part of the world and the factor that will prevent a repeat of 1992. This was stated by Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the formal ceremony marking the day of the Bosnia-Herzegovina police.

This is the first holiday that the police are celebrating in peace after four years of aggression. In the past years, the members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the soldiers of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, took part in the defense and liberation of the country. Members of the "Bosna" and "Lasta" special units and the special maneuver units from Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar, Travnik...have made a special contribution. "In the fighting, 1,150 members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave their lives, but this is not the final number considering that we do not have the complete data from the Centers of Security Service (CSB) in Bihac and Gorazde. More than 2,240 policemen were wounded, many of them several times, and 450 policemen have been seriously disabled," Minister Hebib said.

By strengthening the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina we have created the conditions for this ministry to start dealing with police matters—the fight against crime and creating preconditions for the normal functioning of the state.

"Following the signing of the Sarajevo agreement on the Federation, we believe that the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs will be set up. Appearance of the police at the state borders of our country would be a reliable indication that the unified legal system in Bosnia-Herzegovina functions," Minister Hebib said.

B-H: Defense Minister Expects Accord Soon on Federal Army

AU0504112596 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 96 p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Soljic, minister of defense in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Djuro Kozar; place and date not given: "Civil Command of the Federal Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The defense minister in the government of the Federation has told OSLOBODJENJE that the federal defense law was in its final phase, and that agreement on the two remaining disputed questions would soon be reached—those of the supreme command, and the right to choose the component in which one should serve.*

Vladimir Soljic (52), who came to the leading position in the ministry from "Herzeg-Bosnia," says that the Dayton Agreement anticipates the two-component structure of the Army (the Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army) all the way to the level of corps, whereas defense is in the exclusive competence of the Federation.

[Soljic] Accordingly, it is necessary to find a solution that will best satisfy both partners. In that we are helped by the countries that we call the friends of the Federation, and those countries do not wish to start with the realization of their help on programs for creation and armament of the federal army, until mutual relations in this field are regulated.

Specific Organization

[Kozar] Will our defense law and the organization of the army resemble what the Republic of Croatia already has?

[Soljic] Having in mind the numerous specific areas related to the organization of defense in the federation, we cannot copy any defense law completely, also not the one of the Republic of Croatia. True, in Croatia they also started from scratch and from a position similar to ours, and they used the experience of the most important military powers, which gave significant results. Using the experiences from Croatia, we will "make a long way shorter" in building the army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kozar] The HVO [Croatian Defense Council] closely cooperated with the Croatian Army, which is no secret, and you also cooperated with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in liberating the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What can you say about that?

[Soljic] It is a fact that the period that you mention in your question was the most fruitful in the fight for the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If such forces had existed earlier, it would have been easier to negotiate, and the overall result would have been much better.

[Kozar] Can you tell us the reasons that it was not done earlier?

[Soljic] That is a question for politicians. And as far as I understand politics, you will get no answer. A politician would rather blame an entire people, including his own, then admit his guilt. It will be good if we learn a lesson from this for the future.

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[Kozar] How do you evaluate your cooperation with individual commanders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in that period?

[Soljic] I personally only met General Rasim Delic, and I believe that we both respected agreements correctly.

[Kozar] To what degree will the organization of our defense depend on the dictate of the mentors of the federation, particularly the United States?

[Soljic] There is no dictate. Our goal is the same, to build an effective federal army. There have been requests for the depoliticization of the army, requests for the misuse of religion in the army to be prevented, and so on. I personally support such requests, and I believe that the army should be highly professional and qualified to perform its main tasks.

[Kozar] On which principles will the federal army be built?

[Soljic] The system of defense is one principle, and the Ministry of Defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is directly responsible for it. As I have said, the federal army consists of two components, up to the corps level. Through the Ministry of Defense, the minister, who is a civilian, secures the civil supreme command, meaning the civil control of the army. All other principles are a matter of agreement, and they are subordinated to the main goal—the creation of effective defense.

[Kozar] How realistic are fears that the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and of the HVO could be incompatible in the joint army?

[Soljic] If real goals are those that we have agreed upon and which we have incorporated in the defense law, and the main goal is the defense of the people and the citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then there is no reason for the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to be incompatible. Every case of disobeying the law, regardless whether it aims at domination or separatism, would lead to incompatibility. If we have not learnt that lesson from our bloody and tragic past, it will repeat itself in the worst possible form. I personally do not want that, nor do I believe in that possibility.

[Kozar] You are an official who has come from "Herzeg-Bosnia," so we would like to ask you: Will, for example, a recruit from Grude do his military service in Tuzla, and a recruit from Gorazde in Kiseljak?

[Soljic] Precisely that is one of the two disputable questions. We have to judge realistically and correctly if, for example, it is good if a Bosniak from Gornji Vakuf, whose father or brother was killed in conflicts with the HVO, does his military service in Capljina, or if it is better that he be the one to decide on that. The same question should be answered by a Croat recruit from Vitez, and so on. That choice, that right to choose the component in which to serve, will be the best indicator of the overall situation and relationships in the federation. I believe in natural processes and in respect for human rights, wherever that is necessary and possible. You have to love a country in order to defend it, and you will defend it like a mother, and not like a step mother. Therefore we should organize the country in such a way as to make us equal, and to enable us able to live freely and well in it, and such questions will not arise again.

Without Confrontations

[Kozar] Judging by what you have said now, the Ministry of Defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be superior to the General Staff of the federal army?

[Soljic] The General Staff ["Generalstab"], the Main Staff ["Glavni stozer"], the Joint Staff and all organs will be parts of the federal Ministry of Defense, and the minister of defense is superior to them all. In a democratic state, in this system, the role of every segment of defense is clearly defined. We also will defend that system. In it, it is senseless to try to determine who is "the boss." If the system functions well, everybody is the boss. I as the minister will behave according to the law. If the goal of all of us is the construction of a qualitative system of defense and its good functioning, then there will be no unhealthy and irrational confrontations. The demarcation line should divide those want to work and know how to work, who do their work well, from those who don't.

[Kozar] Has the program of work been drawn up, and what are the main tasks of the Ministry of Defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Soljic] We are preparing the internal organization of the Ministry of Defense, and the program of its work, but we cannot finish any of it before the defense law is passed. There are two main groups of problems. One group consists of problems that concern the organization of the federal army, on which I have already said something. The other group of questions concerns the remedy for the results of war, which are numerous, various, and complex—from material ones, which it will be easier to solve, to human ones, many of which we can only alleviate, but never entirely solve. When I say that I have in mind our soldiers who were killed and whose families have to be provided for, and then also the invalids of war and those who are still in the process of recovery.

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The Problems of the Demobilized

[Kozar] Are demobilized soldiers also in the priority group?

[Soljic] The soldiers who honestly carried out the hardest tasks in the war, and who are now practically on the street, come straight after the ones I have mentioned. They feel deserted, and left to themselves. The confrontation of those people with reality is hard. While they were bleeding, many other got rich. The entire society must take this situation more seriously, and find a quick solution. The possibility that these honest people would go out in the street and "take things into their own hands" should not be allowed, but also not excluded. That would be a new tragedy and a process that nobody could control.

[Box, p 5]

Uncertain Compensation

[Kozar] Lately there has been a lot of talk about soldiers' compensations and securities. How much has the Ministry of Defense been involved with that pressing problem?

[Soljic] As far as I know, it has remained only a decision. That has already earlier been in the domain of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. These organs would have to give explanations to that question, since the soldiers, particularly the demobilized ones, have already become impatient. But, with regard to that, I would like to add something else. Namely, there has been a new breakup between the federal partners without any need or reason. It is known that already at the beginning Croats defended Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later they liberated extensive territories and brought into the federation nearly 50 percent of its territory. And now, according to those decisions, the members of the HVO, which means the majority of Croats, have no right to those securities. It is our standpoint that all those who participated the defense and the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina should get at least minimum compensation.

[Box, p 5]

The Minister and the Deputy

[Kozar] You are a master of sciences in mechanical engineering, and your deputy Hasan Cengic is a theologian. How do you cooperate, and how do you feel among the generals in the ministry?

[Soljic] There is no school for ministers. Of course, it is necessary to have general education, global knowledge of the problematic and of the goals that are to be achieved. It is also important to know how to separate the important things from the unimportant, to use information properly and to have the ability to coordinate. It is true that up to now I was mostly active in the economy, from planning to the construction of projects. I will be most satisfied when I go back to my work. With Mr. Cengic, my deputy, I do not talk about engineering (my occupation) nor about theology (his occupation), but I can say that he is not new in the defense system. He has been involved with complex and responsible work related to defense.

We will have no special problems in contacts with the generals. All military cooperation will follow the experience of the countries in which everybody's role is defined, and where nobody is a state within the state, as was the case with the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the armies in nondemocratic regimes.

B-H: 1st Corps Commander Discusses Army Reorganization

AU0804200396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Apr 96

[Report by Nevres Jemendzic in Fojnica—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of as successful as possible realization of the military part of the Dayton accord, Brigadier Nedzad Ajnadzic, commander of the 1st Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Corps, visited Fojnica today. At the meeting with the officers of the 143th hill brigade and the 145th chivalrous light brigade, Brigadier Ajandzic first spoke about the current military, political, and security situation in our country.

In the continuation of the meeting, the 1st Corps commander spoke about some issues that are very important and pressing for the members of our army. The first topic was the reorganization of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the creation of the professional army of the federation, and the transition to the reserve corps. The exact criteria for a professional soldier and officer have been ascertained. We must find a place for all demobilized soldiers who defended this area in the industry.

It was confirmed that the distribution of bankbooks with the compensations for the participation in the war of liberation will start as of 15 April. The books will first be issued to the families of fallen soldiers and the war invalids.

At the end of the meeting, Brigadier Ajnadzic answered numerous questions from the officers.

Together with the officers of the 1st Corps, the commander of the 14 Division, and the commanders of the Fojnica brigades, Corps Commander Ajnadzic visited injured soldiers and the medical staff at the Republican Center for Medical Rehabilitation in Fojnica. All of them were given small gifts and modest financial compensations provided by the headquarters of the Party of Democratic Action of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Croatia: Sarajevo Denies Link to Terrorist Suspects

AU1104112896 Paris AFP in English 1045 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, April 11 (AFP)—Bosnian authorities have denied any link to a group of Bosnians arrested in Croatia on suspicion of plotting to murder a notorious Moslem dissident now exiled in Croatia, a Croatian daily said Thursday.

Croatian police hauled in the Bosnian "terrorists," as they are called in the SLOBODNA DALMACIJA paper, in a swoop last week to thwart an alleged mission to execute Fikret Abdic, a rich Moslem businessman and key rival to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic who has long been a thorn in Sarajevo's side.

"It is totally ridiculous to think that the government of Sarajevo wants to liquidate Fikret Abdic," said the first counselor at the Bosnian Embassy here, Sead Hadzagic, in a statement quoted by the daily.

"No one tried to kill Abdic during the war...it is completely absurd to imagine such a thing now when the man is politically dead," the Bosnian official said.

Instead, Hadzagic charged the incident may be a set-up to get Abdic back in the news now that he wants to run for president back in Bosnia—despite Sarajevo's warrant out for his arrest. [passage omitted]

Croatian police arrested the Bosnian "terrorists"—four men and a woman—in Senj on the Adriatic, 70 kilometers (43 miles) south of Rijeko. They are now held in Rijeko prison.

According to the Croatian press, the five were "likely" preparing an attack on Abdic on a coastal road into Rijeka, where the group reportedly hid a stash of weapons in the nearby woods.

But the Bosnian official countercharged that the group was "probably close to Abdic's milieu" and "trying to trigger trouble between Croatia and the Sarajevo government to bring Abdic back into the political spotlight." [passage omitted]

Croatia: 'Terrorists' Suspected of Plans To Kill Abdic

LD1004184296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the arrest of a group of international terrorists, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Republic of Croatia in the area between Rijeka and Senj on 4 April, the county state attorney has begun an investigation. On the basis of the Republic of Croatia Penal Code, the captured group is being charged with the criminal act of international terrorism.

The group of six, including a woman, detained after having been stopped and checked by the police near Senj, are all young Muslim adults, residents of Bihac. Two are members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina police, while another one, not available to the Republic of Croatia state authorities, is a member of the Bihac public security service.

[Begin recording] [County state attorney Drago Marincel] There is a well-founded suspicion that the group intended to carry out a criminal act in the area between Opatija and Rijeka and to kill Fikret Abdic. Our investigation has established that a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and explosives was hidden in the area. [end recording]

Under the plan, Fikret Abdic, a politician, businessman, and former president of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia currently staying in the Rijeka area, was to be killed by a hand-held launcher [Serbo-Croat: rucni bacac] on the busy Rijeka-Opatija road. The terrorist group visited the area once before but this time a successful operation by the Lika-Senj and Primorje-Gorani county police prevented them from carrying out their plan.

[Begin Marincel recording] Since we are a peaceful area with burgeoning tourism, a murder of this kind would have unforseeable consequences for tourism and overall security. [end recording]

Until the investigation is completed, the terrorist group will be held in the Rijeka district prison.

Croatia: Terrorist Suspects Linked to Assassination Plot

AU1004133896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 3

[Commentary by J. Pavkovic: "'The Bihac Group' Dispatched to Croatia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The capture of the terrorist group from Bosnia-Herzegovina on the territory of the Republic of Croatia is the main topic of rumors but also of more serious debates in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Official Bosnia-Herzegovina sources are keeping silent, but we have managed to learn some details from other well-informed circles.

For several months some Muslim circles have been planning the assassination of Fikret Abdic. As elections draw nearer, that idea is becoming more and more topical, particularly after (mis)information about his planning to form his own party. Thus the so-called Bihac

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group was formed and prepared to act after studying Abdic's itineraries. However, on several occasions they gave up and replaced the members. Finally people were found who would do that. They A ere promised a large reward and they were even given a considerable amount of money in advance. Their intentions were thwarted by Croatian police near Senj who apparently captured a part of the group (others have taken to flight?).

Many people are wondering ironically now whether assassinations have become a Bihac recipe, indirectly referring to the assassination of an HVO [Croatian Defense Council] general in Bihac, Vlado Santic. Is the failed attempt on Abdic just the beginning of dangerous preelection activity in Bosnian fashion? It is clear that the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] formed the parastate Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID) as early as January, whose fundamental goal is to secure an election victory for its party. Today AID counts 1,400 well-trained spies (the former UDBA [State Security Administration] had in the same region one-fourth the staff), whose task is to carry out assassinations of distinguished politicians and foreign citizens. They have taken over all the most experienced cadres from the former UDBA.

How dangerous this agency is is best evidenced by the fact that the request for the removal of the chief intelligence officer, Bakir Alispahic, has arrived directly from Washington. The Americans want to make sure that his secret service is not linked to secret army training camps, managed by Muslim fighters from Iran, who might plan attacks on American soldiers.

It is highly probable that AID is closely linked to mujahidin, who are living today (in disguise and with Bosnian passports) in many camps. The notorious El Mujahid unit, that used to be based in the Zenica suburb of Podbrezje, has left Zenica. Others have changed their uniforms, obtained Bosnian citizenship, and remained living in surrounding villages. One of such groups is still based in Podbrezje, in Ante Tavic's house. A certain number of mujahidin has remained in the Croat-inhabited village of Orasac near Travnik, and in Mehuric, where some time ago bloody recruitment ceremonies of domestic mujahidin were being organized. In central Bosnia members of such groups have remained in Han Bila and some other villages, where they are hiding, particularly from the eyes of the Implementation Force [IFOR]. Are IFOR soldiers, however, able to bring an end to training Islamic terrorists in the heart of Europe?

Perhaps AID and the mujahidin have nothing to do with last week's attempt at Abdic's assassination (it is more probable that those are police of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Interior Ministry), but it is still clear who is setting the pace of preelection activities in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some people, particularly in the ruling Muslim party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are obviously afraid of a possible failure in the elections. And to this failure some powerful political rivals, both former and present ones, may contribute as well.

Croatia: Action Against 'Muslim State Terrorism' Urged

AU1104094496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by Nenad Ivankovic: "Croatia Has Done Its Job"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As matters stand now, the Muslim terrorists caught in Senj were probably aiming at Fikret Abdic, who, as it is known, found shelter in Opatija after Operation Storm.

This is indicated by the fact that the terrorists, who were caught with large quantities of arms, originate from the Bihac region (probably from Bihac itself), and there are indications that they could be directly connected to the police and security structures there.

Therefore, on Monday official information from the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Croatia (and before that the information from the Council for Defense and National Security, too) stated that those arrested "had, without any doubt, prepared and planned acts of state terrorism" in Croatia.

If those suspicions and indications prove to be true, then we are, without doubt, on the verge of—for the security of Croatia, but also for the security of the whole region—a dangerous process: Muslim state terrorism.

The recent summit on antiterrorism, held in Cairo and attended by all the crucial world statesmen from Clinton and Yeltsin to Kohl and Chirac, not only condemned all forms of terrorism and adopted concrete measures to fight it, but once again confirmed a notorious fact: terrorism does not recognize borders and therefore it is possible to fight it only with coordinated international action.

To that extent, Islamic terrorism, which it seems is gaining strength in this region, is not only Croatia's problem. By arresting those terrorists in Senj, Croatia has proved that it is ready to bring to life the spirit and the letter of the Cairo conference in the most concrete way. However, it is now the turn of the others!

The most efficient way would be the one on which, as it has become more than evident over the last weeks, Zagreb and Washington insist: close cooperation between

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the Bosnian Federation and Croatia and their common integration into western Europe and its institutions. So, further away from the Balkans and the East.

Croatia: Schoups Wants More Resources in E. Slavonia

BR0904132896 Brussels DE MORGEN in Dutch 9 Apr 96 p 4

[Report on interview with Major General Jozef Schoups, commander of the UN peacekeeping force in east Slavonia, by "GSC" in Vukovar; date not given: "Schoups Wants More Money and Resources 'To Remain Credible'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar—Major General Jozef Schoups, the commander of the UN peacekeeping force in east Slavonia, is urgently requesting more people and resources. "If we do not get them quickly, we will lose our credibility because the planning of the peacekeeping operation will become difficult," he said in an interview with DE MORGEN. "The Belgian Government and myself obtained guarantees before we accepted this difficult mission. I hope that everyone will keep to their word and fulfill their promises. Otherwise the chances of success will be reduced." Since last month Belgium has led the military side of the UN peacekeeping operation in east Slavonia. The aim is that the Serbs, who currently occupy most of the area, will give back east Slavonia to the Croats. A UN force is to monitor the smooth transition of the transfer. The Belgian Government accepted the command of the force and is also supplying approximately 900 more soldiers. Because the mission is not simple and the Rwandan debacle is still fresh in people's memories, the government demanded clear guarantees from the United Nations: a solid mandate, sufficient resources, and if necessary NATO air support.

"Our country only committed itself after all its demands had been met," said Schoups. "Now that I have been active here one month, I note however, that not all the promises have been met and consequently there is a danger that my planning of the peacekeeping operation will become difficult." There is a danger of problems in the deployment of military force among other things. "It is still unclear when the 950 Pakistanis and 850 Jordanians will arrive. Without their presence it is impossible for me to start the peacekeeping operation. Therefore in a letter to the United Nations I have demanded that they arrive on 25 April at the latest. Otherwise my planning will be in danger and we will not be able to respect the agreements with the Serbs and Croats. We cannot allow ourselves a mistake. If that happens than we will lose all credibility."

Logistical supplies must also improve, according to Schoups. At present there is a danger of supply problems for the long-term stocks. "I cannot solve these difficulties myself," said the Belgian major general. "The goods arrive in Zagreb but are taken to east Slavonia by private transport, for which the United Nations has made the contract. That is taking place less smoothly than expected. Therefore I have had to map that out as well. In all this the Belgian Government is not to blame, but of course I have informed Defense Minister Poncelet of my report."

Croatia: Settlement in E. Slavonia by FRY Citizens Denied

AU1004172696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Slobodan Milovac, president of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly, and president of the executive council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly Vaso Zigic, as well as their associates, received editors of Novi Sad DNEVNIK Branislav (?Gulan) and Milan (?Bazokin) and TANJUG correspondent from Novi Sad Dragan Kostic. The conversation, which lasted several hours, mostly concerned the current political, security, and economic issues. Our colleague Mladen Gliba has more detail.

[Gliba] In the beginning reporters expressed their interest in the implementation of the program for settling displaced persons from the former Socialist Republic of Croatia who are temporarily accommodated in the Republic of Serbia and who wish to settle permanently in the Baranja area. Reminding those present that the settling of the area started as early as December 1991, that is, when the exodus of the Serb people in the war began, Slobodan Milovac, president of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly, said that 16,394 displaced persons had arrived in Baranja by 1 April and that they have all the rights that civilized beings have and that a civilized community can provide. Milovac added that the settlement program is going successfully and there is no doubt about its full implementation.

According to him, the plan, which was made up on the basis of the Erdut agreement, not only makes the reception and care for all the displaced persons from the former Socialist Republic of Croatia possible but expressly demands it. Milovac said that the claims of Croatian officials and media that citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have also been settling in Baranja are absolutely unfounded and absurd.

Milovac told the reporters that as far as [word indistinct] manipulations were concerned, he was sure that they would see we are doing everything within the spirit of

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the Erdut agreement, as are the people of Baranja, who have been increasingly concentrating on life and work, certain that the time of peace, security, and economic and overall prosperity is coming.

Emphasizing that the program was adjusted to the needs and wishes of displaced Serbs for humanitarian reasons, as well as on the basis of the Erdut agreement, president of the executive council of the municipal assembly Vaso Zigic pointed out that the municipal assembly and the executive council are, in cooperation with the [word indistinct] bodies, doing their best to meet the needs of the people of Baranja as well as of those who are arriving to the area.

The sowing program is going well, particularly for oil crops; the sowing material, fuel, and fertilizers have been secured, as have the 3,000 hectares of cultivable land for the displaced persons, said the president of the municipal government.

According to Zigic, conditions have been met for the settlement of 5,000 more displaced persons, who will have the same rights as the native people.

The guests from Novi Sad expressed great interest in the current economic activity and the possibility of economic development, as well as the security, humanitarian, social, and health care aspects of the social and economic development of the area.

The talks were also attended by the secretary of the municipal secretariat for internal affairs, Bosko Vojnovic; president of the district court Dragan Dasic; assistant commander of the Slavonia-Baranja Division, Major Milan Knezevic; commissioner for refugees Dusan Jerinic, and representative of the Association of Displaced Serbs in Baranja, Milenko Vucetic.

Croatia: Serbs List Tudjman as War Crime Suspect

AU1104074296 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 8 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by B. Maric and R. Matijas: "The Hague Knows but Is Keeping Silent"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The indictments filed by Richard Goldstone, chief prosecutor at The Hague International Tribunal, represent primarily a political act, and this is why for the time being none of the members of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia are on the list of war crimes suspects.

If this had not been the case, said Savo Strbac, one of the leading men at the Veritas Documentation-Information Center, Goldstone would have said something about the contents of the 13 files that Veritas had sent to the Hague Tribunal through official channels.

All 13 files, Strbac explained, refer to the crimes committed by the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia against the population and the Army of the Serb Republic of Krajina [RSK].

Among the files are also documents on the crimes committed by the Croatian forces in Gospic, Pakracka Poljana, and Marino Selo, then the crimes committed in the operations on the Miljevacki Plateau, Maslenica, Medak, and during the Croatian Army's incursion in Mirlovic Polje.

"The Croatian Army and the police attacked Miljevacki Plateau, Maslenica, and Ravni Kotari, as well as the 'Medak Pocket' after the signing of the Vance peace plan. So as the UN Security Council has concluded, Croatia had carried out aggression on the territories under UN protection," Strbac said.

Despite this, in its condemnation of Croatia the Security Council, the founder of the International Tribunal in The Hague, did not go further than issuing a "presidential statement."

The List of Criminals

"In the Miljevacki Plateau 40 fighters of the Serb Army of Krajina were killed or slaughtered. In the aggression on Maslenica and Ravni Kotari 326 civilians and soldiers were killed, while seven are still registered as missing. In Mirlovic Polje seven old men were killed. In the 'Medak Pocket' civilians and soldiers were killed," Strbac explained.

In addition to representatives of the Hague Tribunal, the United Nations also has documentation on these crimes. Apart from Veritas and the State Commission for War Crimes and Genocide of the RSK, the consequences of the aggression by the Croatian troops in the areas under UN protection were also investigated by members of UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force].

"The UN Security Council and I am convinced the Hague Tribunal, too, know exactly the extent of crimes that the Croatian Army and the police have committed over the people and armed forces of the RSK. They nevertheless behave as if these events never took place," Strbac says.

Otherwise, Strbac said, the official contacts between Veritas and the representatives of the International Tribunal would not have been severed at the request of the chief prosecutor Goldstone. In addition to the president of Croatia, and supreme commander of its armed forces, General Franjo Tudjman, the Serb side accuses Gojko Susak, minister of defense of Croatia, and Janko Bobetko, chief of the General Staff of the

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Croatian Army at that time, of having committed war crimes.

The list of war crime suspects also includes a number of senior officers of the armed forces of Croatia. [passage omitted]

The list also contains the names of General Ante Roso, commander of the special forces of the Croatian Army, Mile Cuk, assistant chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army's Guards, the professional units, and Ivan Korade, commander, and Ratko Dragovic, chief of the General Staff of the 7th Guard Brigade of the Croatian Army. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Serb Leader Pupovac Explains SSO Goals, Plans

AU1104093196 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 96 p 4

[Interview with Milorad Pupovac, president of the Alliance of Serb Organizations, by Davor Verkovic; place and date not given: "As a Minority, the Serbs Are at the Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Recently yet another Serb organization was promoted whose main task is to homogenize and strengthen the already existing organizations. It is called the Alliance of Serb Organizations [SSO] and comprises four organizations which have been active in Croatia for some time: The Serb cultural society Prosvjeta, Serb Democratic Forum, the Rijeka Serb Community, and the Community of Western Slavonia Serbs. The SSO was formed immediately after the presentation of a similar idea by Veselin Pejnovic, called the Serb National Congress, which was given substantial media attention. Will such initiatives really lead to a unification of the Serb minority, or do the leading Serb representatives in Croatia have other, secret objectives? We discussed all this with SSO President Milorad Pupovac.

He told us that the idea of forming the SSO had been maturing for several years and that the first signature symbolizing the desire for unification dated back to 1995. [passage omitted]

[Verkovic] Was it your idea from the start that only four organizations should form the Alliance or were there supposed to be more?

[Pupovac] From the very start we wanted the Alliance to include on a voluntary basis all Serb organizations that are or will be active in Croatia, which would coordinate mutual interests, programs, and activities. The Alliance was formed by four organizations which have remained true to the initial idea, but I must stress that we are open to all those who wish to join us. The SSO's Presidency has 15 seats, but not all have been filled, precisely to accommodate those who will decide to join at some later date.

[Verkovic] Who has decided not to join?

[Pupovac] The Serb Community for Rijeka, Istria, and Gorski Kotar, and the Serb Community in Croatia. These organizations participated in the founding from the very start, but at one point they decided to pull out because they had a different idea of what the organization should be.

National Council—The Most Important Issue

[Verkovic] What are the SSO's goals and program?

[Pupovac] The goals are very clear: coordination of the activities of already existing organizations, promotion of Serb national interests in the Republic of Croatia, and long-term planning for realizing Serbs' rights. Unlike other minorities, the Serbs in Croatia are, de facto, at the very beginning and will only be able to realize all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution on a long-term basis. The Alliance, will, therefore, try to promote Serb interests, both in relation to their homeland, Croatia, and in relation to the mother country, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, in addition to these basic points, our program declaration includes other points that pertain to our activity, primarily care for comprehensive Serb interests in the Republic of Croatia. This task will be carried out by the Alliance's National Council which will comprise the most influential representatives of various organizations and distinguished individuals. We will also found a Council for Education and Culture which will meet the Croatian Serbs' educational and cultural needs. There will also be a Council for Organization and Development, a Council for Religion and Religious Culture, which will promote the Orthodox faith. Moreover, we will also have an economic council which will monitor the people's development requirements and will see that they are economically independent. The Council for Social and Legal Protection will deal with human, minority, and civil rights.

[Verkovic] A part of your program declaration reads as follows: "SSO is based on the tradition of personal national autonomies and the tradition of Serbian church and national congresses and Serbian national councils in postwar Yugoslavia." Could you clarify this for us?

[Pupovac] In the past, Serbs in Austria, Hungary, Dalmatia, Slavonia, and so forth, were organized and exercised their national rights in church and national alliances and congresses. They exercised their right to their script, education, national customs; this even

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extended to some sort of economic and business links. The fact that this functioned well inspired us and we took it as the starting point for this project. The other elements are those which developed in the same tradition in Yugoslavia. Today, however, we focus on our members and their interaction within the Alliance. [passage omitted]

Croatia: National Economic Expectations Surveyed

AU1104093796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 96 p 5

[Commentary by Ivo Jakovljevic: "Even Keynes Would Probably Favor a Turnabout"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The large and still completely open project of Croatian postwar restoration has been gaining in momentum by the day, although most of its visible signs are still connected to events and activities in the Banski Dvori [presidential palace] and the Croatian Assembly, and not within the economy itself. The vast public expectation that the new dynamic investment period will eventually occur by itself with the first days of peace was sheer illusion. A part of that illusion still seems to be shared by the Croatian Government, which still holds its own assessment regarding the real growth of the gross domestic product by 7 percent as well as the "continuity of economic policy."

After all, raging through the economy are the shortage of money and disorder in paying debts, and raging through banking are abnormally high interest rates, while as regards war-destroyed or damaged regions, only the most necessary work on restoration of houses and local infrastructure still enjoy priority. During this time, Matesa's cabinet has been intensively writing new bills, through which it is trying to fully Europeanize the Croatian legal system, and covertly prepare the Letter of Intentions, which will serve as a framework for the postwar economic policy, but also to reach a three-year agreement on cooperation with the IMF. In that context, it appears reasonable to expect that at least a year or two will go by before Croatia becomes one of the big construction sites and investment markets of European size. Why is it so?

To Double Savings and Increase Investment Sevenfold. How Is That To Be Done?

For a small country to earn the attribute of "one of the greatest construction sites in Europe," it must allocate between 20 and 25 percent of its national income for investment over at least five to six years. In 1991, the last year before the war, investment amounted to 14 percent of the national income, and last year, the last war year, it amounted to a mere 14 percent of that prewar level! Therefore, in order for Croatia to proceed not only into reconstruction but also into a new dynamic development, it would have to dramatically increase investment at least seven times to start with!

Therefore, in order for a national economy to be able to maintain a dynamic growth rate over a long period, it must also ensure a dynamic investment rate in advance. Since one can hardly expect Croatia to be reconstructed and developed with foreign capital and the capital of its emigrants alone, it must rely upon domestic savings, therefore, upon a corresponding growth of the savings, not only of its citizens, but also of enterprises and institutions. In order to turn into "one of the largest construction sites" in Europe "almost overnight," Croatia would have to direct some $3-4 billion a year into investments. Last year what both the economy and noneconomy paid out for investment was to a value of only $310 million, so the capital expenditures of the state budget were almost double the value of this depreciated sum. Therefore, in order to start a new investment cycle, the Croatian economy must obtain an additional $1-2 billion this year and at least $3-4 billion in the crucial year 2000. Where from?

According to the latest forecast of the State Institute for Macroeconomic Analyses and Prognoses, Croatian citizens have about $4.5 billion in their savings accounts in Croatian banks. It can be concluded that, despite external aggression and depreciative circumstances, saving has survived, and has done so at a high level as it is now at the level of one-quarter of the gross national product. According to that indicator, the propensity to save among Croatian citizens and entrepreneurs is equal to what has for a long time been expressed by citizens and entrepreneurs in the United States, Great Britain, or Hungary! However, one should recall that almost half of these savings deposits still have the status of old foreign exchange deposits, and that they have very low liquidity and high discount in share transactions among enterprises in the process of privatization. It must therefore be concluded that savings and the propensity to save in Croatia are at a rather low level. In a word, in order for the Croatian economy to be able to enter into a new, more dynamic development on the basis of domestic saving, that saving would have to almost double in a very short time.

To Copy Singapore and Germany but Think of Keynes

At first sight, all the conditions exist in Croatia today for a high increase of foreign exchange savings and of kuna savings in particular. Croatia is a politically stable country, the Dayton agreement has reduced the

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investment risk for domestic and foreign investors to a usual peacetime European level, while interest rates on deposits in Croatian banks have for the last two years been literally the highest in Europe! The only aspect in which most Croatian banks have considerably lagged behind West European banks is in the quality of their service (queues, crowds, daily disagreements) and the volume of what they offer (not a single bank has so far offered portfolio deposits to its savers). Therefore, if one is to believe evaluations by Austrian, German, and Italian bankers, and the corresponding new Government evaluation, Croatian citizens have been keeping in foreign banks as much as $6 billion (mostly) in fixed-term deposits to up to five years. If only one-half of that sum were to return in the coming year or two, Croatia would be able literally "overnight" to start a new development cycle without a single dollar from a new foreign loan.

Perhaps this kind of financial comeback was what the analysts of the big Union Bank of Switzerland reckoned with when they recently assessed that "reconstruction and the restoration of tourism may already this year be able to turn Croatia into the economy with the best results in Europe."

However, in the latest study on world competitiveness this same bank has also concluded that by 2000 and afterward, "some world countries will be more competitive than others." As "large investment requires financing from high domestic saving, it is the countries where gross saving surpasses 30 percent of the gross national product that will have a stable and dynamic growth." Today there are already the "tigers" such as Singapore (where the savings rate equals 80 percent of the gross national product!), China (68 percent), the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan (about 60 percent), as well as "chronically frugal and stable" Switzerland (52 percent), Germany (48), Chile, Brazil, India, France, and Italy (about (35-40 percent).

Perhaps Croatia will also be able to copy Asian "tigers" and the most developed western countries, where the unemployment rate is so low that it is referred to as the natural rate, which is a status close to full employment. Only it will not be able to do so just now, at the beginning of the new development, but only in 10-15 years. Does that mean that in encouraging domestic frugality, Matesa's government has to go to the other extreme and use all media and administrative means to incite a new long-term "belt-tightening" so as to have the largest possible part of the national revenue from personal and public spending directed into investment?

In the search for a conceptual and technical solution to this question, it would be wise for Matesa's team to heed the messages with which Englishman J.M. Keynes, the greatest name from the first half of the 20th century, seems to be almost frantically waving from above the Croatian Government offices. In his major work of exactly 60 years ago, this economist among other things explained the paradox of frugality that appears when a country that has a high unemployment rate tries to increase the propensity to save. Even if such an attempt were to succeed, Keynes says, increased saving would cause a decrease and not the desired increase of investment and national income because "if one abandons consumption that means revenue will decrease for the other, and so it goes on endlessly." Therefore, at the time, Keynes suggested increasing consumption in order to decrease unemployment, increase investment, and raise national income.

Let Hungarians Buy Onions and Meat in Croatian Shops!

If even high interest rates cannot bring Croatian citizens' deposits back to domestic banks and investments, is the only thing left to the Croatian Government to use its economic measures so as to make investment easier and stimulate it in order to set a new investment cycle in motion? But how is this to be done? Should it use a budget deficit to additionally increase the already too high public consumption, so that it would use increased consumption and state investments to influence an increase in employment and gross production? With the existing high public debt and an (almost) 60-percent state share in distributing gross domestic product, this kind of Keynesian solution would be more detrimental than the present monetary cold.

Therefore, let us proceed from new developmental goals and their main prerequisites. Goal No.1 is a stable and dynamic development, and not only reconstruction of what has been destroyed. Its first prerequisite is available and cheap domestic capital. Goal No.2 is strengthening competitiveness of domestic supply on both the domestic and foreign markets. Its main prerequisite is the corresponding change in the exchange rate, which would be carried out before the tourist season begins. Goal No.3 (which has been goal No.1 for the last two and a half years) is a stable exchange rate and a stably low inflation. The technical solution that would reconcile goals 2 and 3, in order to reach goal No.1 is possible through the "soft" Keynesian establishment of net domestic bank assets (which was the main monetary anchor in the first standby agreement with IMF) with the corresponding credit expansion. I believe that it would be helpful here to reduce the overly high rate of obligatory bank reserves, as well as to introduce much stricter provisions in the new law on bankruptcy through which

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creditors would be able to chose whether they want to transfer their claims into shares of firms whose future is questionable or collect "at least the bankruptcy process expenses" through automatic bankruptcy.

Therefore, from a net importer, Croatia must become a net exporter of commodities and services, from a country whose citizens buy abroad even garlic, tomatoes, and preserves (not to mention clothes, medicines, and similar products that have traditionally been exported by Croatia), and from a country whose capital, be it legally or illegally, constantly flows abroad, it must become a country whose capital transaction balance is negative over the longer term. Such a turnabout, with present interest rates on loans at between 25 and 30 percent and on short term loans (including payment operations costs) as much as 55 percent per year, and with the kuna exchange rate overvalued according to all estimates, is—does one still need to present proof of it?—impossible.

Therefore, the fact that the competitiveness of Croatian products in domestic and foreign markets is already dramatically weakening indicates to the Government the need for an urgent turn in economic policy. I believe that the IMF analysts who have recently been urgently working with the Croatian side on the text of a three-year agreement on expanded cooperation have also been acquainted with this picture and that they wish all the best for the revival of Croatia's economic capacity in the country and abroad.

Croatia: Commentary Views Debate Over 'Overvalued' Kuna

AU0904135996 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 Apr 96 p 15

[Commentary by Vesna Antonic: "Who Does (Not) Overturn the Kuna?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is the kuna or to be more precise its exchange rate overvalued, undervalued, or just where it should be? Recently the temperature again rose suddenly regarding this dilemma or trilemma. Of course, there are different opinions, depending upon one's viewpoint.

The godfather of the new exchange-rate talks, gossip, and rumors, Economics Minister Davor Stern, gave an interview for GLOBUS that is now already legendary. He was talking, let us remind you, about the need for a "softer monetary policy" and a "correction of the kuna's exchange rate." The minister immediately refuted the interview that was published in the weekly, saying that he had been misinterpreted and as usual making the interviewer the scapegoat.

Prime Minister Matesa did not remain cool. Reports from government sessions say that the first man in the government slapped the wrists of his cabinet members. The prime minister has stated clearly and intelligibly that in future cases he will ask all those who publicly express opinions that deviate from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] program to take personal responsibility. In fact the prime minister has, very kindly and wrapped in glossy paper, said that there might be removals from office if such practices continue. Almost immediately that triggered rumors that Minister Stern had offered to resign. However, the Economics Ministry spokeswoman says that she knows nothing about it, and she is the person who would certainly know about it.

That legendary Stern interview has been followed by articles on whether or not the kuna is overvalued. Everything has been stirred further by a VJESNIK correspondent who wrote that "the Croatian kuna, as the National Bank of Croatia [NBH] has also officially admitted, is a highly overvalued currency" and addeded that, both from the graphs and from the texts published in the NBH Bulletin, one can see that "the kuna is a strongly overvalued currency and that it is even overvalued by 30 percent."

To everybody's surprise, the NBH reacted promptly with a statement from the pen of Velimir Sonje, executive director of the Research and Statistics Department of the NBH, who, on more than six pages, explained that the correspondent was wrong—mostly because he presented his own stance as that of the NBH. "Even if that idea were correct (which it is not), it is not correct from the professional point of view to offer such interpretations in someone else's name," concludes Sonje, by pointing out that the NBH stance is completely different. The kuna is not overvalued, and the Bulletin of the NBH does not contain a sentence or a graph that would in any way indicate that it is.

Dr. Marko Skreb, the new NBH governor, also remarked on the same article at his first meeting with correspondents. Of course, without denying anyone's right to their own opinion or expert discussions, Dr. Skreb resolutely denied that the NBH had confirmed the thesis on the overvaluation of the domestic currency. "We neither said nor confirmed in the text of the NBH Bulletin that the kuna is overvalued. That is not our claim, and it is not a new statement because the data on the real effective exchange rate of kuna has been announced publicly for two years," Dr. Skreb pointed out. At the same time, he rejected any thought of the devaluation of the kuna on the eve of the tourist season, which is the wish of many tourist officials.

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Whatever the case may be and if one can judge from the old saying about smoke and fire, many are ready to gamble on an (im)possible devaluation of the domestic currency, despite the refutations from all relevant sides and the ruffled feathers of everyone from Former Prime Minister Valentic to Matesa, not to mention Deputy Prime Minister Skegro. The games with the bouncing exchange rate ball are nothing new to us, and they are obviously continuing. The end result? We will see.

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FYROM: Gligorov Rules Out Changing Country's Name

AU1004185596 Skopje MIC in English 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] cannot back down from the constitutional name, which was established back in 1944 at the session of ASNOM (Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia), President Gligorov stated in the interview for radio "Free Europe," MAKFAKS reports.

The erasing of a period of 50 years of the existence of the state is not possible, because it will cause unforeseeable consequences for the stability of Macedonia and the whole region, President Gligorov emphasized, adding that the name can not be changed, no matter who is in power in Macedonia.

Describing the dispute over the name as a precedent unknown in international politics, President Gligorov added that after the signing of the Agreement in New York, the process of normalization is underway.

Discussing the differences over the name, Gligorov emphasized that it is a very delicate question that should not be solved quickly by seeking a compromise which would not satisfy either side.

In Macedonia, Gligorov emphasized, that could cause consequences which may well trigger a new conflict in the Balkans.

Answering the question whether he is concerned over the possibility of the conflict spreading to the south of the Balkans, President Gligorov stated that such a possibility exists if a reasonable solution to the Kosovo problem is not found. Yugoslavia, Gligorov added, should take advantage of the favorable stance of the international community that Kosovo is an internal problem of Skopje [as published] and the negotiating table, and to seek a solution for some kind of autonomy in Kosovo.

Emphasizing that Macedonia is for cooperation with all the states in the Balkans, President Gligorov stated that Macedonia is decidedly against a Balkan association, which would have a political-economic character.

The idea of including Macedonia in some kind of association and having it sacrifice some elements from its sovereignty in return, has no chances of being accepted, President Gligorov emphasized in the interview for "Free Europe."

FYROM: Maleski Says Succession Position Unchanged

AU0904154896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the recognition of FRY, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] did not change its stance on the problems connected with the issues of the former joint state. That is what Deputy Foreign Minister Ognjen Maleski assured our Skopje correspondent Vanja Vardjan: [Begin recording] A senior Macedonian diplomat who was in the Foreign Ministry delegation in Belgrade yesterday unofficially said that the succession issue of the former joint state would be resolved multilaterally; that is, not in the direct negotiations between FRY and Macedonia but in the negotiations of all countries that have emerged following the disintegration of SFRY. This, supposedly, ensues from Article 4 of the agreement on mutual recognition, which says:

Departing from the fact that Serbia and Montenegro existed as states prior to the formation of Yugoslavia and acknowledging the fact that Yugoslavia continued the international and legal continuity of these two countries, the Republic of Macedonia recognizes the state continuity of the FRY.

Macedonia, therefore, recognizes the continuity of Serbia and Montenegro; however, it does not recognize the FRY's continuity of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Let us also add a statement by Macedonian Foreign Minister Dr. Ljubomir Frckovski that the countries would resolve the succession issue with contracts. As this is a complex problem we cannot say for sure when will it be resolved. [end recording]

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Poland: Daily Says Yeltsin 'Spreading Fear of NATO'

WS1004123196 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by Bronislaw Wildstein: "Creating a Threat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the elements of Boris Yeltsin's election campaign is projecting the image of a privileged partner of the West. The Russian president suggests that, if the communist Zyuganov is elected, the West, terrified, will immediately enlarge NATO. If, however, Yeltsin stays in office, the West can rest assured that the status quo will be retained and Poland will remain in the anterooms of the alliance forever.

Irrespective of the validity of these arguments, they are a strategic element of Yeltsin's platform. However, if this strategy is to be effective, the Russians have to fear NATO enlargement and the acceptance of Poland as a member. Recent opinion polls indicate that barely over a dozen percent of Russians think Polish membership in the alliance poses a threat for their own country. Despite what Yeltsin is saying, it is not true that Russian citizens oppose Poland's joining NATO. Politicians are trying to convince them to believe this for their own purposes.

The lack of discipline in implementing liberal reforms did not improve the condition of the national economy. Proceeding with the reforms is risky and collides with the interests of various influence groups. It is far easier to appeal to nationalist feelings and nostalgia for the empire, which serves to provide solace for impoverished people. Boris Yeltsin is clearly evolving in this direction. He has a vested interest in spreading fear of NATO so that he can firmly counter the alliance.

Poland: Daily on First Three Months of Cimoszewicz Cabinet

WS1004135996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Malgorzata Subotic: "It Is Now Clear What Cimoszewicz's Cabinet Cannot Do; Major Breakthroughs Must Be Achieved Within the First Eight Months"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's Cabinet has just passed the halfway point of the period traditionally considered as a litmus test of what a given government can achieve. At present, we know what the current Council of Ministers will not do: It will not implement national territorial reform. The prime minister said so himself at the first meeting he held with voivodes recently.*

The chief of the Cabinet suggested the reform might fail at the first news conference he held. He said he would try to reach an agreement on the issue with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], the coalition partner, and, if he did not succeed, the voters would be asked for their opinions (meaning that the reform projects would be presented in the course of the parliamentary election campaign). For nearly one and a half months afterwards, Leszek Miller, chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, repeatedly announced that he would like to carry out territorial reform—splitting the country into 12 voivodes, further subdivided into powiats. He also said he wanted to exact an opinion on the project out of the government. The prime minister's statement, however, indicates that the idea of reaching an agreement with the PSL was quickly forfeited.

What will be the fate of the reform of the administrative and economic center announced by Jozef Oleksy's Cabinet? At its last session, the Council of Ministers adopted an amendment to the draft project. If it is passed by the Sejm, a Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Administration will be formed, and the Office of State Protection will be taken out of the ministerial structure and subordinated directly to the prime minister. The proceedings of the Extraordinary Commission to which these suggestions have been submitted, however, show that the chances of completing the reform of the state economic center are not very large. The PSL wants two new ministries to be established: the Ministry of the State Treasury and the Ministry of Privatization. Deputies from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Freedom Union are against the idea. There is also no agreement on which economic ministries (for example, the Ministry of Industry) should be liquidated or when.

The draft project of the social security reform (health-care reform) has been resting with the Sejm for several months now. As far as social security is concerned (pensions), only basic guidelines for the reform have been developed. No draft law is ready yet. The entire project calls for passing more than 20 new laws. Thus, one may hardly expect that the Cimoszewicz team will complete the second phase of Polish reforms (pertaining to social issues).

The following controversial draft laws are at the completion stage at the Sejm: the law on the consolidation of banks and the law on the commercialization of state companies. The latter, passed by the Sejm once before and vetoed by the former president, has been questioned by the Constitutional Tribunal. Now that controversial provisions have been removed, it stands a good chance of becoming effective.

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Prime Minister Cimoszewicz has often stressed that his Cabinet will try to complete what his predecessors began, limiting the amount of "novel" projects.

Each cabinet is given a period of approximately 100 days to launch full-swing operations. This suffices to assess the real intentions and capabilities of a new Council of Ministers. Even in far more stable democracies than ours, it is generally believed that, if a government is to achieve anything, it must do so within the first eight months in power. Later months are either fine-tuning or a continuation. The first democratic government, formed after the elections of June 1989 and headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, launched major reforms—and the only revolutionary ones to date—in its fourth month in power. At the time, the Sejm passed a package of laws commonly known as the Balcerowicz reform plan.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's Cabinet is the third consecutive government formed by the SLD-PSL coalition, backed by a parliamentary majority of nearly two-thirds. This has been so since the fall of 1993.

None of the Polish governments that rose to power after 1989 operated for much longer than a year (Pawlak's and Mazowiecki's Cabinets hold the record). The current government will not stay in power much longer. This time, however, we know it for certain. Prime Minister Cimoszewicz said at the very beginning that his Cabinet is to operate until the next parliamentary elections. It means it will operate for one year if parliamentary elections are held earlier, in the spring of 1997, and a couple of months longer if they are held in the fall of 1997 (after the current parliamentary term expires). If the second option proves true, the Cimoszewicz government, appointed last March, would break the time record of remaining in power.

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Romania: Funar: U.S. Congressman 'Blackmailing' Authorities

AU0904121896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a declaration issued today, Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], formulates several reservations and question marks regarding the visit of the U.S. congressman [Tom Lantos], which in his opinion is intended to exert pressure and obtain advantages, by blackmailing the Romanian authorities, for Hungary and the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania].

The PUNR leader asserts that Mr. Tom Lantos, one of the emissaries of Hungarian irredentism, came to Bucharest recently to determine the signing, as soon as possible, of the treaty of understanding, cooperation, and good neighborliness between our country and the Hungarian Republic, a treaty that is being negotiated and that is based on Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe and based on the UDMR demands for the European standards to be exceeded to the benefit of Romanians of Hungarian ethnic origin.

The leaders of the Romanian state and the Romanian diplomacy should consider the way in which they signed, ratified, discussed, and disputed the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia as a warning signal and also a subject for reflection, the declaration points out.

Romania: Party Chairman Criticizes U.S. Congressman Lantos

LD1004223496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An influential Romanian politician has sharply criticized the U.S. congressman who has spoken out for the interests of Hungarians. Peter Marvanyi reports from Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures]:

[Marvanyi] Hungarian leaders and Hungarian irredentists have sent Tom Lantos [U.S. congressman of Hungarian origin] to blackmail well-meaning Romanian politicians—Gheorghe Funar, chairman of the Romanian National Unity Party [and mayor of Cluj-Napoca], says in his statement. According to the mayor of Kolozsvar [Cluj-Napoca], the American congressman was not authorized to exert pressure on the Romanian parliament and Romania's president. We cannot accept Tom Lantos's one-sided views, since he met only the representatives of UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania], and neglected the Romanian parties—in fact, he opposed them, said Gheorghe Funar. The Romanians will not forget that Tom Lantos voted for withdrawing the Most-Favored-Nation status for a year, says the statement.

By the way, as the Romanian media reported, during his Bucharest visit, Tom Lantos held talks not only with the highest-level statesmen, but also with the deputy group leaders of the parliamentary parties. Although he suggested more liberal and generous minority policies, at the end of his visit he said that the political situation in Romania has improved.

Romania: PSM Opposes Idea of NATO Using Airports

AU1004170796 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 2 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by R. Mitroi: "PSM Opposes NATO Presence at Romanian Airports"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the last weekly news conference by the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] fell on 1 April, PSM Vice President Adrian Paunescu tried to relax the atmosphere by saying something that sounded like "the PSM has decided to join NATO on its own." The journalists laughed at the joke, but the PSM's genuine stance regarding NATO activity was revealed by the communique that was read quite seriously by Eugen Florescu [PSM secretary]: "We declare that we will reassert our opposition to the use of Romanian airports as NATO military bases, as we consider this an act that hampers our state sovereignty and directly injures our national dignity." This is nothing new under the PSM sun.

Romania: 'Compromise' Found for Treaty With Russia

AU1104080196 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1020 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Statements by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sorin Ducaru in his weekly news conference held in Bucharest on 10 April, reported by correspondent Doina Seiciuc—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Seiciuc] The Romanian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sorin Ducaru held his weekly news conference today and has reasserted the categorical Romanian goal of integration into euro-atlantic structures and particularly integration into NATO.

[Begin Ducaru recording] Our central objective as regards the acts of ensuring national security and promoting Romania's interests in this respect is integration into the European and euro-atlantic security structures. The objective of integration into NATO is in this respect our primary goal and we are currently devoting all our

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efforts to it and we are most actively involved in this process.

[Seiciuc] Here is Mr. Sorin Ducaru's reaction to and statements on the remarks made yesterday in Moscow by Mikhail Demurin, deputy of the Russian Foreign Ministry Press and Information Department, according to which, during the talks held last week in Bucharest between Romania's Foreign Minster Teodor Melescanu and the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov, a solution has been found to including a form of condemnation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in the text of the basic bilateral political treaty.

[Ducaru] The statement made by Mr. Demurin reflects the results of the recent consultations that took place in Bucharest between the Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu and Russian Deputy Foreign Minster Sergey Krylov. As we have also mentioned, like the Russian side, the conclusion of these consultations was that this meeting was extremely useful and emphasized a range of solutions to the last problems still pending and a compromise solution is currently taking very concrete shape, as the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman also mentioned. We also anticipate with greatest interest Mr. Primakov's visit to Romania for the meeting of foreign ministers participating in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone that will take place on 27 April, and we believe that Mr. Demurin's statement reflects this willingness and openness also of the Russian side, as we also expressed our position at the end of the visit that Mr. Sergey Krylov paid to Romania. This is a compromise convened by both sides. Both sides have absolutely agreed upon it and Mr. Demurin's statement reflects the result of the talks between Mr. Melescanu and Mr. Krylov and of solutions that they agreed upon together. Hence, it refers to the act of finding a technical formula that can be acceptable to both sides.

Romania has made and continues to make efforts in this respect and found this formula of compromise, which permits the condemnation of this pact to be reflected in documents.

Romania: Ambassador Discusses Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact

AU1104092296 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1930 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Statement by Romania's Ambassador to Chisinau Marian Enache, following his meeting with Moldovan Foreign Minister Popov in Chisinau on 10 April, reported by correspondent Valentin Tigau—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tigau] The current stage in the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova was the main subject of the meeting between the foreign minister of the Republic of Moldova Mihai Popov and Romania's Ambassador to Moldova Marian Enache, held today in Chisinau. The sides discussed the major common directions in the diplomatic activity in April, among them the forthcoming visit of the Romanian head of diplomacy Teodor Melescanu and the meeting of the interministerial committees of Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The presence of the Romanian Foreign Minster in the Moldovan capital city will certainly occasion discussions on a broad range of subjects, among which we believe will also be the issue of concluding the bilateral basic treaty.

As is known, the major obstacle on the path of finalizing this treaty is Romania's request that the Republic of Moldova condemn in the text of the document the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, through which the former USSR annexed the territory between the Prut and Dniester Rivers. Marian Enache, our country's ambassador to the Republic of Moldova, will express a theoretical approach to this aspect, which emphasizes Romania's position.

[Begin Enache recording] I believe that first of all it is very important to see how we approach the issue of this defunct pact, thus, I believe that what is important here is the interpretative method used and the criteria to which we relate the content of this obsolete and aggressive instrument, which is called the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

I believe that in our times everybody is happy to use excessively and unilaterally the pragmatic method of compromise, of making up the differences in the detriment of solutions that express respect for the truth and for the lawful aspect of the respective facts.

Within the, let us call it, obstinacy of pragmatic solutions, which usually generate a circumstantial political thinking, politicians are concerned with granting comfortable and instantaneous solutions to concrete circumstances and sometimes ignore the moral value of the historical fact, which in the area of fundamental existence, I believe can be a prejudice and a real frustration.

I believe that the problem of the Ribbentrop-Moldotov Pact should be regarded within this framework. In other words, there are opinions that show that regarding this pact one should take into account the new historic realities, which would no longer permit discussing this fact. However, at the same time, there are opinions which regard the criteria of morality of the historic facts, invoke the arguments of justice and truth of these facts, and demand appropriate reparations. These two ways of judging things, although essentially inseparable, nevertheless are considered by some politicians, for selfish interests, as distinct possible solutions. As is

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known, the next century, if it is not going to be apocalyptic, it will be much improved from a moral viewpoint. Without this approach, we all would be afraid of the terror of history, a terror which is in fact a vice of humanity. Therefore, I believe that Romania's position toward the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact will have to take into consideration both the new historic realities as well as the minimum moral significance of truth and justice in evaluating the facts and their corresponding reparation in one way or another.

I, as a person living at the end of this century, believe in a lesson and even an aesthetic aspect of history at the beginning of the next century, when artificial things such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact will have disappeared.

Romania: Court Contests Article in Law on Parties

AU1104105396 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 4 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Corina Dragotescu: "The Law on Parties Returns to the Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The law on political parties will be reexamined by the Parliament. The PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] and the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] have submitted objections to this law to the Constitutional Court. The court rejected almost all objections of unconstitutionality, leaving the law as it had been passed by the Parliament. There was only one point that was accepted and, consequently, declared unconstitutional, therefore the law will be returned to the Parliament. Under these circumstances, its promulgation will also be delayed.

The accepted objection is rather technical and refers to Article 3, Paragraph 2, which forbids the existence of parties which violate various articles of the constitution. The court has decided that one of the remarks made in the text is pointless, namely Article 148, on revising the constitution. Considering that political parties cannot ask for the revision of the constitution, the court decided that the reference to this act in connection with the article on limiting the revision is unconstitutional.

The two political parties which attacked the law continue to be displeased. The PUNR is mainly angered by the fact that ethnic parties have been accepted, while the UDMR believes that the obligation to have 10,000 members in at least 15 counties and 300 in each county is an artificial impediment in the path of freely exercising the right to association. The UDMR also contested the article which compels all parties to be reregistered according to the new law, believing that the principle of nonretroactive nature of the law is thus violated. None of these objections have been accepted. The obligation of parties to have 10,000 members and to reregister within six months from the day the law is published in the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal's record of political parties continues to remain valid.

Romania: Hungarians Want Ruling on Local Government Law

LD1104111596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0800 GMT 11 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] group of senators in the Senate has submitted an appeal of protest concerning some of the clauses of the local government law. The appeal questioned the constitutionality of the clauses in question.

The appeal, which was supported by several opposition senators, criticized, among other things, the fact that the law had made obligatory that a translation into Romanian be attached to applications and petitions submitted to local government offices and by doing so the law had curbed the rights of citizens to use their mother language.

The UDMR also expressed opposition to the introduction of the institution of prefectures because, it said, the constitution recognized only the government prefects.

Romania: SRI Explains Magureanu's Talks With PUNR

AU1004193096 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 2 Apr 96 p 12

[Communique released by the SRI Press Office; date not given: "During His Meeting With PUNR Legislators, Virgil Magureanu Supplied No Information About UDMR Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with certain statements made by Mr. Gheorghe Funar [president of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR] and reports in the press citing "PUNR sources," following the talks held by Mr. Virgil Magureanu, director of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], with members of the PUNR factions in the two chambers of Parliament at the latter's request, the SRI Press Office has been authorized to state the following:

1. The object of those talks was not UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] activity as a political party, but rather the clarifying, using genuine and correct terms, of the situation created by the demonstrations planned for 15 March this year, which aroused fears on both sides.

2. Therefore no "information about the UDMR was supplied," as the talks solely referred to the destabilizing potential of the demonstrations in question.

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In this context, it goes without saying that the SRI director made no assertion to the effect that on Romanian territory there would be any "paramilitary organizations of Hungarians," which would be "at the center of attention of the CSAT [Supreme Defense Council of the Country] and the MI [Interior Ministry]" or that "there are loopholes in Romanian legislation, allowing promoters of Hungarian irredentism to take important steps toward turning entire regions in Transylvania into enclaves," or that "4 percent of the Gross Industrial Product of Hungary is earmarked for secret actions to undermine the Romanian state," or that "the property coupons and vouchers throughout Transylvania would be directed, by means of certain consulting companies set up by the UDMR, toward the counties of Covasna and Harghita," and so on.

All these things are mere allegations, lacking all grounds as compared with the genuine contents of the talks held by Mr. Virgil Magureanu with the PUNR legislators, and the entire responsibility for the circulation of this news lies with those who made them.

Romania: Parties Hold Symposium on Ethnic Minorities

AU1004123796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, during a symposium on "Parliamentary Political Parties and Ethnic Minorities in Romania," Adrian Nastase, executive president of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], stated that, quote, we cannot ensure two speeds for democratization, namely one for the majority population and a different one for the ethnic minorities, unquote, after which he emphasized that some of the failures regarding the ethnic minority rights pertain to the failures in the general democratization process in Romania.

Talking concretely about the ethnic Hungarian minority, Adrian Nastase pleaded for a sincere dialogue, from which all mutual suspicion should be eliminated, and which should be based on confidence.

In his turn, UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Senator Karoly Szabo praised the PDSR for having initiated this seminar, after which he addressed an offer to the ruling party to begin pragmatic talks on concrete issues regarding the ethnic Hungarian minority.

Other issues broached during the debates, in the speeches made by the other personalities attending the event, among whom our correspondent mentions Gheorghe Raducanu, a Chamber of Deputies member representing the Romanies' Party; Dinu Zamfirescu, leader of the PL'93 [Liberal Party '93]; Adrian Vilau, a Chamber of Deputies member on behalf of the PD [Democratic Party]; Traian Bandila, executive secretary of the PRM [Greater Romania Party]; Renate Weber, a representative of the Romanian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights; Razvan Dobrescu, a Chamber of Deputies member on behalf of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party]; Stana Buzatu, a member of the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] Steering Committee; and Ivan Truta, executive secretary of the Council for Ethnic Minorities, referred to the desirability of a law on ethnic minorities, as well as that of the existence of political parties based on ethnic criteria, the need to prevent chauvinism against the majority population, the issue of the representation of the Romanies in Parliament, and, last but not least, the need to overcome the communication barriers and the stereotypical perception of the problems related to ethnic minorities.

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Slovenia: Succession Expert on FRY-FYROM Recognition

AU0904144496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Interview with Miran Mejak, chief of the Slovene negotiating team on succession, by Sonja Znidarsic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Znidarsic] Dr. Mejak, what does the mutual recognition of the FRY and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] mean for Slovenia?

[Mejak] As is usually the case in foreign policy, Macedonia made its decision in accordance with its interests. This should not be of any major significance for Slovene foreign policy.

[Znidarsic] The four successors to the Yugoslav heritage agreed to act unanimously against the FRY regarding the succession. Is this solo move by Macedonia not unfair, if I can say so?

[Mejak] I am convinced that UN Resolution 1022, according to which all the countries are equal successors, still applies at the moment. For that reason, the communique stating that Yugoslavia and Macedonia will resolve the succession issue consentaneously represents nothing new because we must all resolve the succession issue unanimously. It would be easier, of course, had this matter regarding the succession been postponed for a while, but essentially this means nothing especially new or harmful for Slovenia.

[Znidarsic] Does this mean that nothing has changed with this mutual recognition regarding the succession?

[Mejak] It should not, in my opinion. Apart from this, in all my contacts and those of others with the Macedonians, they have always maintained that the succession issue was a subject on which we should all reach an agreement.

[Znidarsic] One more question, Mr. Mejak. When will the succession talks resume?

[Mejak] Mr. Bildt [UN special envoy to Bosnia] has appointed the chief negotiator [name indistinct] who will probably call a meeting at which we would resume talks at the end of this month or next month.

Slovenia: Emergency Health Decree Passed

AU1004165596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 10 Apr 96

[Report by Helena Lovrincic on a news conference by Health Minister Bozidar Voljc and government negotiator Tone Rop in Ljubljana on 10 April—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government regrets that the negotiators [striking doctors, government] have not reached an agreement yet and that Fides [physicians' trade union] did not accept the best government offer that still falls within its macroeconomic goals.

Before the start of the strike, the health minister agreed with the directors of the health institutions that they would provide emergency medical aid, which entails treatment of children and chronic patients. However, after three weeks of the strike the definition of emergency care has been expanded. If the strike does not end by Saturday, the partial medical services will also include everything connected with the preservation of vital functions, deterioration in medical condition, chronic diseases, fevers, infections, poisoning, fractures and other injuries, control of contagious diseases, prescription medications included on the national list, and emergency medical transportation. Apart from everything cited above, this will also include medical care for children and youths under 18, all services connected with pregnancy and birth, as well as health care for citizens over 65.

The physicians must provide this emergency assistance in their workplaces in the public health institutions where they usually perform them. This particularly applies to Ljubljana where physicians are currently only working in the medical center on Metelkova Street and in the municipal children's hospital. According to Minister Voljc, services connected with the termination of pregnancy and contraception also fall among the services connected to pregnancy. He was not aware that the physicians did not provide these services during the strike.

The government expects that the physicians will receive this decree with understanding because it is not directed against them or the strike but only aspires to meet the public interest, which remains paramount.

Tone Rop said that they had met unofficially with Fides this morning and that they would resume negotiations in the evening. He said that the negotiating sides were relatively close and that there was a realistic chance of ending the strike this week; however, everything depends on the negotiations today and tomorrow.

Dr. Voljc also said that the Ljubljana Medical Center paid physicians their full salaries for the duration of the strike, which is contrary to the government decree that stipulates only payment for services performed. The government will send the accounting report to the medical center tomorrow.

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Federal

FRY: FRY Expects To Export Products Worth $586 Million

LD1004152996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1156 GMT 10 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 10 (TANJUG)—The mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Macedonia has created conditions for the European Union to recognize FRY and open up its market to Yugoslav products which would this year enable the Yugoslav economy to generate exports worth 586 million dollars.

TANJUG learned this on Tuesday from Milan Njegomir, the secretary for economic relations of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and the general director of the Livestock Fund.

'We count on earning 90 million dollars for the export of meat, meat products, livestock and fish, nine million from the export of wine, 170 milion from vegetables and fruit, 253 million from wheat and wheat products, 20 million from sugar and 38 million dollars from tobacco and cigarettes,' Njegomir said.

'The export of livestock and meat to E.U. countries could this year be worth over 70 million dollars,' Njegomir said and added that at the time of the sanctions and during the past few months following their suspension these Yugoslav products had not been sold on European markets.

The agreement between FRY and the Republic of Macedonia calls for increased economic cooperation, Njegomir said. He underscored that better results could shortly be expected in the exchange of agricultural and metal products between the two countries, as well as in the sphere of transport and tourism.

FRY: Foreign Currency Seen as Key to Economic Recovery

LD1004182196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1555 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 10 (TANJUG)—A lack of foreign currency is the main obstacle to the future development of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Beogradska Banka A.D. General Manager and chief advisor to the governor of the Yugoslav National Bank Ljubisa Igic said on Wednesday.

He warned against a serious imbalance between money supply and foreign currency reserves which were now dropping daily by one million dollars.

Dinar liquidity can be improved and fresh working capital obtained only by increasing foreign currency influx, not by printing money, and this is why the foreign currency crisis poses the key problem, Igic said.

Financial backing from abroad (loan and share capital) can improve the situation with foreign currency, therefore a normalization of relations with international financial institutions is necessary, Igic said.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should strive to have its status in international financial institutions defined so as to secure the necessary foreign currency backing for its Programme 2 (Yugoslav economic recovery programme approved by the Yugoslav Government in November 1995), Igic said.

In late March, Yugoslav Government officials started talks in Paris with the IMF on Yugoslavia's membership in international financial institutions. The talks were the first after a several-year break following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the introduction of U.N. sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

On return from the Paris talks, Yugoslav National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic said that the membership continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not been resolved and that it would be discussed at the next round of negotiations.

Igic expects a higher foreign currency influx as a result of the deblocking of Yugoslav assets abroad and increasing Yugoslavia's exports of commodities and services.

Igic warned that Yugoslav protagonists of economic policy should persist in realizing the privatization process, liberalizing foreign trade, reducing budget expenditures, drawing up social programmes, and financially rehabilitating the banking system.

Only a consistent implementation of structural reforms will enable Yugoslavia to speedily meet the demands by international financial institutions, Igic said.

FRY: Shortfalls of Overall Energy Supply, Demand

96BA0208A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Feb 96 pp 8-9

[Article by D. Nedeljkovic: "Empty Balance Sheet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Even a superficial analysis of the energy balance sheet for this year reveals many of its shortcomings.*

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As this article is being prepared to go to press (on Thursday, 15 February), the federal government will probably be adopting the Energy Balance Sheet for 1996. This is a document that is formally a constituent element of economic policy measures but that in essence is an exceptionally significant source of information for energy producers and consumers, since it regulates domestic production, imports, exports, market availability, prices, terms of delivery, etc. And if it is adopted as expected, unfortunately we will have an empty balance sheet only on paper, but without a real influence on the flow of energy. It is hard to guess why this document is even being adopted, unless it serves to fully cover a certain function and certain activities of the federal administration.

Objections to the way in which the country's energy balance sheet is formulated and enacted are raining down on all sides. There are a multitude of them, so we will focus only on the key ones. Under the constitution, the federal government is responsible for the conduct of energy policy and the enactment of the energy balance sheet, but in practice the constitution is disregarded and each republic pursues its own energy policy and adopts separate energy balance sheets. The approach of drawing up a balance sheet and pursuing a policy on the republic level, and then combining them on the federal level is not the same thing as doing so, with one balance sheet and one policy, on the country level. However, this balance sheet is not even a combination of the republic balance sheets because Montenegro has adopted its balance sheet but Serbia has not yet done so.

Nor is the time at which the balance sheet is enacted insignificant. By law, everything should take place in December in order to start anew in January, but the fact that the balance sheet is still being debated in February has a direct influence on its quality. Still the financial side of the balance sheet is a more complex problem than harmonizing figures on the production, consumption, import, or export of energy, according to several criteria. The economic policy measures for this year stipulate that energy prices will "cover production up to the level of simple reproduction." Never mind that no one knows what to do about outstanding debts, foreign obligations, and the resources needed for development: It is a fact that current prices do not cover this simple reproduction. On the contrary, new losses are being incurred with the current prices, especially in mining operations, the electric power industry, and heating plants. Not only are there no overhaul programs to cover the losses, new losses are, in fact, piling up. This paralyzes the operations of not only the energy systems, but also a large share of the industries and services that supply these systems.

Foreign exchange is especially troublesome. According to the balance sheet, 43 million metric tons of coal, around 3 million metric tons of petroleum derivatives (nearly 2 million from imported petroleum), 2.75 billion cubic meters of natural gas (approximately 2 billion from imports), and 37.6 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical energy are supposed to be produced this year, and 600,000 metric tons of coke are supposed to be imported. This will require $760,000, but no one knows where that foreign exchange is supposed to come from and whose responsibility it is to find it. Logic dictates that the government that enacts the balance sheet assumes responsibility for its realization, which means that the federal government should decide the prices for dinar payments, but also the foreign exchange for energy imports. That is not how things stand in practice where obligations are simply erased or ignored for the sake of satisfying formal requirements.

Even a superficial analysis of the energy balance sheet for this year reveals all the shortcomings that it contains. The extent to which energy is utilized inefficiently is a public secret, and this document promotes a further waste of energy. If energy consumption is compared to the social product, Yugoslavia is three to four times less efficient than developed countries. For this year, the federal government has projected a 12.5 percent growth in the social product, with a 24 percent rise in the consumption of primary energy? In the part of the balance sheet relating to electrical energy, last year's level of production and consumption is preserved, which means that there is simply no electricity for any sort of increase in economic activities. In the case of petroleum and natural gas, a high growth rate is planned (131 and 73 percent, respectively), but scarcely half of the consumption level prior to sanctions would be achieved.

Perhaps the most important target—that energy must become a commodity, be sold on the market, and have an economic price—conflicts with practice in the republics. Noneconomic prices are being stubbornly maintained, with the explanation that neither the economy nor private citizens are in a position to pay, since the conditions for conducting business are poor and wages and the standard of living are low. There is no doubt that this is true, but the question is this: Who put the economy and the citizens in such a position, and will energy prices in fact help or hinder the economy and the citizens?

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[Box, p 9]

Industrial Production: Just as We Hoped...

In January industrial production in Yugoslavia was 9.7 percent greater than in the same month last year. Relative to December, however, production fell by as much as 13.4 percent, but that can be regarded as (almost) normal since December production is generally among the highest, while January production is among the lowest over the course of the year. Nevertheless, when one factors in the so-called seasonal adjustment indexes, production in January is 8.4 percent greater than in December. Some observers are attributing this relatively good January result to the fact that all the holidays fell on days when no work was being done anyway.

Growth in production was posted in all areas except in the production of textiles, leather, and rubber (a decline of 2.1 percent). The greatest growth was realized in the manufacture of nonmetallic metals and building materials—130 percent—followed by the metal industry (nearly 45 percent), the manufacture of basic industrial chemicals and paper (40.4 percent), the food and tobacco industry (6.8 percent), wood processing (5.3 percent), metal processing and the electric power industry (3.8 percent), and energy suppliers (3.4 percent).

Montenegro has experienced a true small miracle because it increased production in January by 5.8 percent, while in relation to January of last year the growth is as much as 75 percent. Production in Serbia fell 14.4 percent compared to December, while it increased 7.8 percent relative to January 1995.

In relation to last year's average production, a decline of 4.1 percent was realized in January.

Serbia

Serbia: Ex-JNA Officer Denies War Crimes in Vukovar

AU1104084696 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 96 pp 16-25

[Statement by Veselin Sljivancanin, former Yugoslav People's Army officer indicted for war crimes by The Hague Tribunal, given to Momcilo Petrovic on 19 March; place not given: "Sljivancanin: 'Who I Am, What I Am, and What I Did in the War'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *It took Veselin Sljivancanin a long time to agree to talk to me. News came from The Hague that he was accused of war crimes, newspapers published the arrest warrant issued by IFOR [Implementation Force], some other newspapers took the part of the persecutor without any reserves... and he replied: "I am afraid that people will say: 'Look at him. Sljivancanin again, he wants to appear in the newspapers.' I do not have to explain myself to anyone, I have a clear conscience, before myself and before the people...." We talked on 19 March, the day before the trial in The Hague started. The Hague tribunal is trying him, but people are trying him too. This is what I heard:*

I learned about the indictment from newspapers. I was not informed that it was official, nobody told me that I was charged with certain things.... I do not watch television, I do not have time to watch television, but someone told me that the "Karic" television broadcast the report, or it might have been a roundtable—I do not know how these things are called—in which it was mentioned that the trial would start on 20 March.

All my friends and colleagues accepted the news in the same way I accepted it—not with remorse, but with anxiety, as an offense and a humiliation not only for me, but for all the people who were on the front, since everybody knows me well; everybody knows what and who I am, what I do and how I feel. I am not a bloodthirsty person, a beast, or I do not know what. I think that I am a completely normal human being who loves everything beautiful. And most of all, I love my people and my home country, for which I fought in order to enable the children and families of all the people who are like me to live here. [passage omitted]

Vukovar, My Story

It was September 1991. Every unit had its own tasks, which were probably assigned by the highest-ranking leaders in charge at that time. We followed the events in Croatia through the mass media at that time. We saw that people were suffering, that they had to flee, that they were dying, that a war was being waged, that predominantly members of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] were dying, those who loved Yugoslavia, and that there were many Serb victims....

It is only natural that my unit, just any other unit, was in a state of combat readiness at that time.

According to the decision of the then Supreme Command it was decided that we should go to Vukovar, since the barracks in Vukovar and Vinkovci suffered the most severe damage and had the biggest problems.

A company of soldiers was encircled in the Vukovar barracks. They were exposed to fire from Ustasha positions all the time. The same is true of the Vinkovci and Osijek barracks.... They could have saved themselves, but it was also possible that they would remain trapped there. Either was possible, that they would get out or that they would be trapped.... Anyway, the situation was difficult, and the Guard Brigade was ordered to help.

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The commander of the brigade was Colonel Mile Mrksic.... The task was to help the JNA units in that area, to liberate the barracks, and to create the conditions for a kind of life there, which means that our goal was not to take the barracks—which would mean allowing the enemy to fire at us from a distance of one kilometer. Our goal was to disarm all those who could have killed or in any way affected our soldiers in the barracks from a distance.

At that time, we were the legal armed force and the strongest power of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY], a country recognized by the whole world. Our task was therefore to protect our nation and our people in our own country, to protect our home country. In short, to protect the constitutional order and peace, freedom, and equality, and to ensure that the right of every person to free movement was respected.

It was probably up to the politicians to decide whether someone should have moved away. You can see that many Serbs are forced to leave their homes now. This means that the politicians could have agreed on the same thing at that time. They could have said: "You should move to that region, and you should move to this region." The army should have made this possible. We constituted a country, and I trusted it. It was sacred to me. It was a pleasure for every honorable man, every honorable officer, every soldier to go to help the people who were in danger, regardless of whether they were Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, or Macedonians.

Apart from that, it was impossible to endure that situation, you could not have felt good knowing that someone was destroying barracks in your own country, that your young soldiers were being killed in your own country?! Not to mention the people, women, children.... What about the officers who suffered? Many of them lived and worked in Slovenia for 50 years, although they were born, for example, in Cacak, Niksic, or I do not know where. Everything they had, including their families, were suddenly at stake. You could not remain indifferent to all those things.

And we headed for Vukovar. I had a completely different feeling about the whole thing, to be honest. I thought that it would have been enough for the army to appear and to tell the people: "Wait...." I told Ustasha soldiers through a radio station: "We are so powerful that you cannot do us any harm, do not force us to shoot and to kill each other, to die uselessly." I did not say these things in order to impress, I really felt that way. I told them that it was stupid. Their commander was Lieutenant Col. Mile Dedakovic Jastreb, who attended the same schools as me, and I called him and told him: "We went to the same school, we took the same oath under the same flag and laws, let us meet and agree like human beings, let us create conditions for a normal life of the people."

It was thought that we knew each other personally, Jastreb and I, but we had never met.... I did not say these things to him in order to cheat on him, I really wanted them to come about. He asked me who would guarantee his safety. I wanted to guarantee it, I am not the kind of man, it would have been nasty.... It is cowardice to abuse somebody's trust. How can you invite someone to come to you and then take a pistol and kill him? That is not honorable. I once told a story about the folk tale about Sirdar Scepan. If you do not know it, you should read it. A Montenegrin waged a war against the Turks. He did not even want to kill slaves. He only fought against the commanding Turk. Scepan defeated him and told everybody else: "You are free...." This is how the story goes.

In other words, we performed our tasks as has already been reported. Enough stories have been told about it. One felt bad there, one led young people—we came from Belgrade where people sat in restaurants, danced in discotheques, led a normal life—and took them to a place where we were shot at from all sides. Shells were falling, we could not have put up a tent, we did not have a kitchen, we could not drive a car. And all this in our own country! We did not go to someone else's territory, we went to a place to which we should have come as people. And suddenly, we had to survive. We tried to get in touch with Jastreb, we tried to tell them [the Croatian forces] that things should have been done in another way. We wanted to tell them that we would be forced to use force in order to dispel them, that they had to respect the laws and regulations effective in that country, that we could all live together normally in that country, and that where people would live could be decided later. They always replied: "You are Chetniks!" I was especially offended by that. I am not a Chetnik. I was a member of the JNA at that time. I was an officer of the legal army that existed in that state.

No One Wanted To Send His Son to War

They called us other names too such as "Bandits." You can imagine how I felt leading these young people... children, 18 or 19 years of age, to a war that was not declared by anyone; and especially not declared by us. It was not a war, I do not think it was a war. If it had been a war, the whole country would have participated. You simply had to save what could be saved or to allow Ustasha soldiers to slaughter who they wanted to slaughter and to occupy what they wanted to occupy. Had we not defeated the Ustasha soldiers in Vukovar, they would have crossed the Danube River and gone as

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far as they wanted. People were apathetic. It seemed that, beginning in Slovenia, everything went wrong. Everyone was indifferent and asked himself: "Where is the JNA? What is going on?" On the other hand, no one wanted to send his son to the JNA; everybody thought that someone else would wage war for him.

Everybody had a bad feeling, everybody felt sorry that a group of hooligans went around disarming our units, shooting around, and doing other things. Why did they disarm our troops? Because neither our soldiers nor our commanders were taught to shoot at their own people. We considered the Croats our own people! I can claim this with full responsibility and honor. We were not bloodthirsty toward them, as they were toward us; they killed and slaughtered young soldiers serving in the army and did other awkward things.

In our unit, for example, there were many Croat soldiers and not one of them—and they were born in Zagreb or in Zagorje—wanted to stay behind when we began to perform our tasks. They said: "We want to go where our friends are, where everybody else is in order to fight." These young people were not as full of nationalism as the people under the influence of Croatian politics who behaved in that way.

One of the first victims was a Croat soldier from Zagreb. I remember that he was killed by a mortar shell. As soon as we arrived and began to prepare to take positions and put up our shelter for the night, they attacked us with mortars. Some of our soldiers and officers died... and so on.

War Is Completely Different From What You Learn in School

This is something you can only understand if you experience it... especially the first moments. Or our experience in towns—you are on a plain and then you reach a place. You do not know the region, you do not know from which direction the bullets are coming. You came to save the soldiers who were in the barracks, and 400 or 800 shells and missiles fell on the barracks every day. The troops were put in the basements, they could not come out, and we could not make a coordinated attack.

Various things happened. There were various situations. Like for example: Ustashas set up an ambush in Djeletovci. I was driving a Puch vehicle at the front of an armored battalion and our flag was waving. All of a sudden, we were shot at with antitank weapons. Luckily enough, the shells struck 1 meter in front of our vehicle, so we accelerated and disappeared around a bend.... Suddenly, you felt that you were not so indifferent.

Those first days were difficult. I always slept with a helmet on, but there was no sleep. I held my gunbelt firmly all the time. At the beginning, I could not tell the difference between our own bullets and the enemy's bullets—I had the biggest problems in the first 10 days, until I learned to tell that difference. Once you mastered the situation, you deployed the soldiers, posted a guard, decided who would do what.... After that, everything went in a completely different way.

...There was a relatively high number of volunteer or civil defense units. We took over command on approximately 30 September. The worst thing for an army is not to have a command, as there is no discipline and order. You can bring thousands of people and still achieve nothing if there is no order. They are unorganized, panicky, aimless.... We tried to put everything under one command, regardless of the price. This was very difficult.

There were various paramilitary formations and groups. They called us, the JNA officers, communists and other names. They trusted some of us, and others they did not trust.... Rumors soon started circulating. This only caused disorder and made the commanding of units and the mobilization difficult.

At that time, the Croats—who know only of Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]—were not interested in any other goals except the creation of "their beautiful country" as they called Croatia, and they were not interested in which political party they were members of. Tudjman is God for them and is the God of the HDZ. On our side, however, volunteers came to the front—some of them were Seselj's followers, others Draskovic's.... You could not put them together, they immediately wanted to shoot at each other.

...I never wanted to remove the red star from my cap, I was in love with it. That is why I carried the Yugoslav flag on the left side; I did not wear my insignia, I wore the Yugoslav flag. I met the people you mentioned, Seselj and Arkan.... It is a shame to tell a different story now, one that would correspond to the present period, you have to be honest. When Seselj came to Vukovar and when I met him, he had an exceptionally positive opinion about all Yugoslav Army members. He spoke with a great patriotic feeling about Yugoslavia and about the Serbian and the Montenegrin peoples. He spoke with great patriotism about JNA members. I am not a politician, but I do not think that he spoke against us at that time.... He said with great patriotism that it was our destiny to fight—the same thing I am talking about now—and about what Germany and other intelligence services did against our country. This means that he

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did support our struggle, but he never supported any atrocities, revenge, bloodthirsty acts....

I think that Arkan is an exceptionally able man, better than others physically, courageous, a man born to be a soldier. He was nothing without the JNA, however, since the JNA had tanks, artillery, a medical corps, rear support, and similar things, but he was a man who always tried to help JNA members. I did not discuss politics with him, his political opinions. None of us discussed politics—we only wanted to liberate the town, to create the conditions under which everyone would be able to move freely and live where he wanted. And to prevent shooting in the town. Our enemies were Ustashas. I could not stay quiet and wait for them to kill me. And I was there to perform my task to the best of my ability—we were the legal army.... I wanted to save my young soldiers, volunteers, reserve personnel, and so on; to save their lives, since their lives are important.... The Serbian and Montenegrin peoples have never waged a war of aggression in their history. They were only forced to defend their territory, their humanity, and the humanity of others or had to help those who were oppressed. We did not go there in order to occupy territory, to seize something from somebody else. There are various commentaries today that claim that war profiteers were active there. This is a shame, this is an offense against the graves of the people who.... I remember my officers who completed military academies with the best possible marks, and they are being spat on today!? They went there to defend the things I have just mentioned, to protect all soldiers and to preserve the constitutional order of their country, they gave their lives for that; how can they be called profiteers? Cowards, those who were always in the rear and who did not go to the front, think that the people who were at the front could do all imaginable things. This is not true!

Why All Reporters in Vukovar Looked for Me

I have never given an answer to this question, but I will be more precise now so that you can write more about it and report what the situation was like. I am a quiet man, I think. But when I am given a task.... You have to understand that I learned in the army—and I am used to it—that a task cannot be performed endlessly. A task has a beginning and an end, and some stages in between—every operation that is being planned, or a battle. Every plan has to be completed by a certain date, relying on the assessment of the enemy and the assessment of your own forces, taking into consideration the time, territory etc. Like every other normal, young man I wanted, once I was there, to complete my task as quickly as possible. I do not know why I am like this, but I have always liked sports, and, whenever I could, I went in for sports... and I always liked to win. This is not peculiar to me, this is the quality of all young people—everybody likes to win, and, when you support a certain team, you also want them to win. The same is true of a soldier or an officer. Apart from that, I told myself: "You are young and able, healthy, normal... you have your family and your friends—why should we stay in Vukovar for 100 days if we can complete the operation in 10? Let us establish order, create the conditions for a normal life, and the whole thing will be over. Not endlessly." [passage omitted]

About Crimes Against Humanity or the Geneva Convention, as You Wish

During the battle, during the participation in the combat activities and actions, everyone tried to help everybody else as much as possible. There were cases when you learned from a young soldier how to behave, how to respect humanity until the end—in cases where he protected others with his life.

If the people who now live in Croatia or anywhere else abroad care for the truth, if they are courageous enough to appear, they should be allowed to say how these soldiers behaved, whether they ever asked anyone whether he was a Croat or a Serb, Muslim, Czech, or something else. For example, our soldiers reported—since a commander cannot be everywhere on the front—that the enemy wanted to surrender, that some people were on the way with a white flag. We ordered that they should be allowed to come closer and then surrender. One was driving and others had their guns ready and—you know how naive young soldiers are—when they came close to our soldiers, they killed them, turned the vehicle, and fled, throwing away the white flag! Scenes like that happened. Or for example, seven of our soldiers got lost and, later, some people from Vukovar—who came out of a basement on Sremskih Vladara Street, I think—showed us the yard behind a building where they had been killed. If they had at least been killed and buried like human beings! They were burned and the remains, the ashes, were then put into the earth. Another example. We found a man and took a picture when he was saying: "I killed these soldiers, I pulled out gold teeth, I slaughtered this woman and raped this girl." But this did not influence our soldiers to become arrogant or revengeful. I looked at them with pride, and I told this to some of my superiors.... There were more than 5,000 people in Mitnica [part of Vukovar], 50 of our soldiers came, and not a single one aimed at somebody in the crowd. Instead they tried to find out who belonged where.

I am frank with you.... I have never sworn in my life, I cannot swear to you now, but I feel ashamed

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if someone does not believe me. Wherever I was—and I could not be everywhere—but wherever I was, I did not find anyone on our side who was a criminal, a thug, or a person who committed the crimes that have been attributed to us.

You have to differentiate. In a large town like Vukovar, where many Serbs lived, the people who stayed there to defend their homes, whose houses were destroyed, whose father or mother, brother or sister was killed... it is easy to tell these stories now, but it was difficult to live with the people who mourned, lamented, and cried every day... if such a person came across someone he knew from Vukovar, it is possible that they threatened each other and did other things that should not have been done—it is difficult to describe or discover how they behaved among themselves. It is difficult to lecture on behavior in a civil war in which a neighbor killed his neighbor, a Catholic slaughtered an Orthodox. This was difficult to control.

You cannot disassociate yourself and say: "I guarantee that no one was hurt." It is difficult to find out whether there were such things, and they will never be investigated. Wherever members of the JNA or the volunteer and civil defense units under our command went, they behaved solely in the manner on which we had decided—as soldiers, with dignity, honesty, and so on.

"His Wife Wept for Six Months"

I am told that I had a list of Ustashas! It is only natural that I had a list. What kind of a commander and security officer would I have been if I had not had a list of those who stirred up the people and led them into crimes and atrocities? I had lists, this is true. I am not denying it.

I found many of the people from that list. If I were a criminal, I would have murdered these people.... I would have ordered my soldiers and officers to kill them; I would not have saved the lives of, as I did, of Vesna Bosanac, Marin Vidic, Njavro, Dmitra Karaula... and so on, I cannot remember all these names... who went to Croatia. They are worse criminals more anyone else, they should be the first to suffer instead of innocent people.

What was our goal? At that time many of our soldiers were detained in barracks all over Croatia. Many Serbs were in prisons and are still there. The Ustashas did not release anybody for exchange. And we wanted to exchange our soldiers and officers who were there. My classmate Relja Tomic, for example, was arrested in Gospic. His wife wept for six months, she did not know where he was. I told Vesna Bosanac: "You are my enemy, we do not have anything in common; if we had, you would not have shot at me and my army and you would not have been in the committee in which you were. You have fought for your ideals, and I am fighting for mine. I am not bothered by that. I am releasing you; go to Franjo Tudjman, but I want Relja Tomic alive." I have mentioned Relja Tomic now, but there are many officers like him. Our first goal was that those who violated a law should bear the responsibility for it. Why did we take them to Sremska Mitrovica prison? We took them there because they violated law and the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia, which is not mentioned by Ustashas, various criminals, or the international community now. Our second goal was to exchange them and save the lives of our soldiers and officers. We could have decided to kill everybody instead of arresting them. We could have said that battles were fought and that they had died in battle. [passage omitted]

Evil Place, Ovcara

That damned Ovcara, which is constantly mentioned.... Our first soldiers died there when we went to put up our tents.... Sergeant Paunovic died there, for example. Ustashas came from the Dubrava forest, where they were hiding, killed him, and ran away. There is a collective farm there; it is situated, I do not know exactly, but approximately 10 to 15 km from Vukovar, in front of the Dubrava forest. I know very well where it is situated, there were quite a few buildings there.... The position was very unfavorable. The Ustashas shot at Ovcara all the time. They used to come from the forest, and they killed our soldiers, officers.... An unlucky place, I would say. The most notorious Ustasha stronghold was Mitnica, and when you go from Ovcara to Vukovar, you have to pass Mitnica first. There were cows and pigs there, and we selected the people who were incapable of fighting to take care of the cattle, in order to save all that, so that the people who would stay there would have it later on.

When we took Mitnica, Dmitar Karaula, the Ustasha commander—he is alive, he lives in Croatia now because he was released from prison and if he is brave, he will confirm what I am saying—said that he would like to surrender and that he would make a list of his soldiers, which we required. We wanted to have it, since we wanted everyone who had violated the law and who was armed should be held responsible. We told him that he would be released if there was appropriate proof, adding that, otherwise, he would be either imprisoned or exchanged for Serbian soldiers detained in Croatia. This list is still in the JNA archives. I cannot recall the exact number of the people on it, but I can only make an inquiry about it. Karaula lined up all his

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troops in Mitnica, saying: "These are my soldiers, they shot at you, we want to go to prison, we want to be exchanged," and was treated according to the law and was sent away, following an agreement between the representatives of the international organizations. Since we had no choice—this is what MONITOR and other papers that publish lies are manipulating—we took them from Vukovar to Ovcara. We did not have enough vehicles to transport them all at once. We wanted to evacuate the civilians. first the women, children, and elderly, to protect them from those who had lost fathers, grandfathers, and so on and who wanted revenge. Apart from that, we wanted to protect them from the winter; it was November, it was raining, snowing, there was mud everywhere.... Therefore we had to transport the prisoners in several batches, who we then kept in Ovcara.

"My Prisoners Are Alive in Croatia. They Should Tell the Truth"

There were 182 or 183 people on the list, I cannot tell you exactly.... We kept them in Ovcara and provided them with everything that could be provided. Nobody was hurt by the time we found vehicles to transport them to Sremska Mitrovica prison. They were questioned there and, after that, all of them were released and are still alive. They live in Croatia. They should tell the truth! After that, there were no detentions or other extraordinary events in Ovcara. Already at that time, I issued a statement about that.

We kept records every day, a war diary, we made reports, wrote down orders, everything we did. We were a regular unit, and every order, everything, was written down, everything that was ordered was recorded honestly and it is in the archives now. We wrote reports and analyses and submitted them to our superiors in the required form. Certain war trophies, horrible things, are mentioned now. All this is fabricated.

There were various imputations among officers through the press, and everything boiled down to Sljivancanin. I can only say that neither I, as a JNA officer, nor any other officer or soldier was trained to steal, take away, or wear something that did not belong to him. We were not taught to assess the value of a painting or of an object in a church. We were taught to love our home country and our people. Nor were the Ustashas so naive as to leave us treasures behind, as rumor has it. If they had something, they either buried or took it with them. We entered everything we found in our records and handed it over. I can confirm it. Regarding the claims that we did certain things or took something away, I can say from my point of view that I would not allow my children to eat something that was soaked in someone else's blood. I would not allow my children to wear something around their neck or on their body thta had belonged to someone who died. I would not be able to sleep. I am not afraid of anything, I have no traumas, no evil pictures appear before my eyes. I only see the picture of my late driver, Mr. Popovic, a very brave man who was killed by the Ustashas in my presence. I was surrounded and barely escaped. This picture appears to me. There is nothing else that bothers me, since I did not do anything. I did not want to take any souvenirs with me from Vukovar. Nor did other soldiers. We only wanted to complete our task and to return to normal life. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Milosevic Accused of Undermining IMF Talks

LD1004181196 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1333 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 10 Apr (FONET)—Vesna Pesic, chairperson of the Civic Association of Serbia, said today that what was happening on the domestic political scene was "intensive running on the spot," which is best reflected in the postponement of the federal assembly session and undermining negotiations with the IMF.

At a news conference Vesna Pesic said that "Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic himself stands behind this big self-deception and organized waste of time."

She went on to say that a session of the Federal Assembly at which privatization and the enterprise law should have been discussed had been postponed until May, and also wondered what was happening with the amnesty law and why The Hague Tribunal had not yet opened an office in Belgrade, as it had been promised.

As yet another example that "a failed government is buying time," the leader of the Civic Association of Serbia cited the underminini of negotiations with the IMF by Milosevic's men from the Yugoslav delegation who raised the issue of the continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the negotiations, although IMF is not competent to examine that issue.

"Undermining these negotiations means undermining FRY's embarking upon real changes. IMF demands open market economy and abolition of monopolies, and as this government cannot accept that, it has undermined the program and thus done damage to our citizens," Vesna Pesic said.

She said that the hardening of the government's attitude toward independent media on the one hand and the announcement of the launching of a TV station by the Yugoslav Left [Milosevic's wife's party] on the other.

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were bringing into question the holding of fair and democratic elections in the country. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Draskovic Criticizes Delayed FYROM Recognition

AU1004120896 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Secret Plans Put Off Recognition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, Belgrade and Skoplje should have established diplomatic relations much earlier.

"The blame for the great delay should be placed with the side that had been planning with some neighboring states to break Macedonia into pieces, secretly proposing a confederation between Serbia and Greece," Draskovic told the BETA agency.

In his opinion the full normalization of relations between Serbia and Macedonia, meaning also economic and cultural reintegration as well as the abolition of customs and border tariffs, is possible only after the fall of the current regime in Belgrade.

Serbia: JUL Hopes To Inherit Yutel's Slot on Eutelsat

AU1004151796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by V. Radivojevic: "Jultel Instead of Yutel?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yugoslav Television, whose relaunching Yugoslav Left [JUL] President Ljubisa Ristic has announced, should, according to the announcements, be the successor to Yutel not only in name but also in getting the Eutelsat slot that was in the past negotiated by the television station. A reliable source at NASA BORBA claims, however, that such a succession is not possible—unless the words about "the struggle against crime" by the JUL leader are just words—as it is illegal.

Formally speaking, Yutel still exists. It is registered in Motovun [Croatia], was never erased from the media register, and still has a channel on Eutelsat.

On 15 April 1991 the television station signed an agreement on Eutelsat system use by "the Yugoslav Television Channel," which is Yutel's full name, with PTT Traffic of Serbia as the intermediary. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Conference Held on Media Responsibility, Freedom

AU1004161596 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The BORBA daily has organized a roundtable conference on the topic of media responsibility. Many people involved in journalism spoke about how far freedom goes when journalistic activity is concerned as well as about the status of the media in our country. SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] spokesman Ivica Dacic participated in the conference as a guest. Marina Stojadinovic has the details:

[Begin recording] [Stojadinovic] It is believed in civilized countries that freedom of the press must not threaten public interests, public morals, the country's security, or ethnic, racial, and religious tolerance. Instigating war and causing violent overturns of the constitutional setup is forbidden, SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic said. He pointed out that no new theories need be invented for this topic, it is sufficient to include in our political theory and practice connected to the media only that which Western parliamentary democracies have long written down, Dacic stressed and added the following:

[Dacic] [words indistinct] political newspapers and media that are political cannot be [words indistinct]. It can belong to a political party or not, but must have an active critical attitude toward reality. It is therefore no wonder that there are newspapers in the United States in whose mastheads it says that their orientation is democratic or republican and so on. In fact, this is exactly what it says: Republican independent or Democratic independent newspaper and the like.

[Stojadinovic] Zivorad Djordjevic, BORBA director and editor in chief, recalled that the responsibility of the media is a significant segment of society. In his opinion, it is often reconciled to the so-called Yugoslav variant of democracy which is often opposite to civilized societies of the West that we often cite. Some media proclaim their personal type of freedom which equals primitivism and spiritual ruffianism. Western societies forbid this and in our country individuals call this phenomenon lack of democracy.

Avoiding work in the parliament is a pure political monopoly. Many people want to have power presented to them and if they fail there they start shouting and cursing. Pluralism of opinion is almost alien to them, Zivorad Djordjevic concluded.

Dusan Cukic, chairman of the Yugoslav Journalists Association, pointed out that this association possesses lists of media receiving foreign financial help. Thus,

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under the guise of independent journalism one can find interference in our country's internal policy. The goal is to use the media hullabaloo in the street to replace legally elected authorities.

Speaking about the responsibility of the media were JUL [Yugoslav United Left] spokesman Aleksandar Vulin; Dragan Radevic, editor in chef of the Novi Sad DNEVNIK; and many others.

Although they had been invited to take part in the BORBA roundtable conference, representatives of the so-called independent media did not want to come. [end recording]

Serbia: Government To Cut Public Spending 20 Percent

LD1104094796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0857 GMT 11 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 11 (TANJUG)—The Serbian Government has decided to reduce public spending by 20.2 percent in the January-June period in agreement with the dynamics established by the republican budget for the period.

Public spending in Serbia in the June-March period was in agreement with the income dynamics, the Serbian Information Ministry has said.

The government has also passed a bill on Serbia's annual balance sheet for 1995.

The adoption of an extremely limited approach to all forms of public spending secured that 98.7 percent of the planned budget was met, the government said.

No revision of income was made in 1995 and the lacking funds were secured through redistribution of budget funds.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Opposition Groups Plan Novi Sad Mass Rally

LD1004201396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1358 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 10 April (SRNA)—The Democratic Party [Demokratska Stranka—DS], the Serb Renewal Movement [Srpski Pokret Obnove—SPO] and the Civic Alliance of Serbia [Gradjanski Savez Srbije—GSS] will organize a meeting in Novi Sad 20 April, the three parties announced at a press conference in Novi Sad today.

The meeting will be addressed by the leaders of the three parties, Zoran Djindjic, Vuk Draskovic, and Vesna Pesic, respectively.

"We expect 30,000 people to attend and will do everything to ensure that the meeting passes peacefully. We are also aware that the authorities will do their utmost to try to undermine the meeting," the Novi Sad DS spokeswoman, Gordana Comic, said.

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